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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
From the beginning of Mr. Erickson's trial to the end, he was repeatedly deprived 
of his constitutional rights by the State, including his rights to equal protection, to due 
process and a fair trial, and to be free from self-incrimination. The State began the trial 
by using its peremptory challenges to exclude only men from the jury, violating 
Mr. Erickson's right to equal protection. Throughout the trial the State also violated 
Mr. Erickson's due process right to a fair trial. This began during the State's opening 
arguments when the State vouched for the veracity of the alleged victims in this case, 
and proceeded through closing arguments, including many instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct. The State's misconduct also spread into the trial itself where the 
prosecutor made himself a witness by using facts not in evidence to ask questions, and 
by twice trying to get in information related to Mr. Erickson's prior drug use and drug 
charges. The prosecutor also elicited testimony that Mr. Erickson refused to be 
interviewed or answer questions about the allegations in this case, violating 
Mr. Erickson's rights to due process and to be free from self-incrimination. Finally, the 
State used improper and irrelevant "bad act" evidence, that Mr. Erickson had not paid 
child support, to aid in convicting Mr. Erickson. Therefore, this case presents several 
issues for the Court's review. 
First, it presents an issue never decided by the Idaho Supreme Court regarding 
when an objection must be made to a party's use of peremptory to challenges pursuant 
to Batson. It also potentially presents issues of first impression in Idaho regarding 
whether the State must object to the timelines of a Batson challenge below and 
1 
whether, absent a timely objection, a Batson violation can be reviewed for fundamental 
error. Mr. Erickson contends he made a timely objection to the State's peremptory 
challenges, and even if he did not, the State's failure to object below to the timeliness of 
the challenge below waives the State's ability to raise this on appeal. Finally, if his 
Batson challenge is deemed untimely, Mr. Erickson contends the prosecutor's actions in 
this case should be reviewed for fundamental error. 
Additionally, this case involves extensive prosecutorial misconduct by the 
prosecuting attorney in this case. Throughout the State's opening and closing 
arguments, as well as its questioning of witnesses, several instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred resulting in the denial of Mr. Erickson's right to a fair trial. The 
prosecutor also impermissibly elicited testimony on cross-examination of the initial 
investigating officer of this case, Tony Vollmer, that Mr. Erickson did not come in to be 
interviewed and refused to answer questions about the accusations in this case. 
Finally, Mr. Erickson contends that the district court erred in admitting testimony 
that Mr. Erickson had not paid any child support because no 404(b) notice was 
provided, and it was improper character evidence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 2004, Detective Tony Vollmer, with the Bannock County Sheriff's Department 
was contacted regarding allegations by Mr. Erickson's step-daughter, L.H., that 
Mr. Erickson had inappropriately touched her while residing in St. Charles in Bear Lake 
County. (Trial Tr., p.388, Ls.16-25, p.389, Ls.21-23, p.391, Ls.17-24.) Later, 
Mr. Erickson's daughter, C.E. also alleged that she had been inappropriately touched by 
Mr. Erickson. (Trial Tr., p.89, Ls.1-14.) Charges were not filed against Mr. Erickson 
2 
until 2007. (R., pp.53-54.) During this time, Mr. Erickson who was separated from his 
wife, Tammy Erickson,1 attempted to reconcile with her before again separating. (Trial 
Tr., p.307, L.17 - p.308, L.10.) The separation became quite tumultuous at times, 
culminating in Tammy Erickson going to Mr. Erickson's parents' home with three of the 
children and taking the truck that she believed belonged to her as well as Mr. Erickson. 
(Trial Tr., p.309, L.12-p.310, L.3, p.437, L.10-p.441, L.19.) 
Mr. Erickson was ultimately charged by Information with three counts of lewd 
conduct with minor in 2007. (R., pp.53-54.) Prior to trial, the State filed a Notice of 
Intent to Introduce Evidence of other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts under 404(b) seeking to 
use evidence of other acts committed against the alleged victims consistent with the 
testimony given by the alleged victims at the preliminary hearing. (R., p.27.) The 
defense filed a Pretrial Motion making several motions, including moving to "preclude 
the State from introducing allegations of abuse outside Bear Lake County" because this 
evidence violates 404(b), is more prejudicial than probative, and should otherwise be 
excluded under relevancy standards. (R., p.103.) The motion also asked the court "[t]o 
prohibit, in limine, the State or its witnesses, from in any manner raising other bad acts 
of the Defendant, including but not limited to his pending drug charges in Utah, drug 
usage and or possession during the marriage, on the grounds of undue prejudice." 
(R., p.104.) 
These matters were taken up at a pretrial hearing. (R., pp.175-76.) The district 
court subsequently issued an Order Re: Motions in Limine. (R., pp.179-85.) In relation 
1 Because several witnesses in this trial have the last name of Erickson, these 
witnesses will be referred to by their first and last name, rather than Mr. or Ms. Erickson, 
to avoid confusion, with the exception of the defendant, Mr. Erickson. 
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to the allegations of prior misconduct occurring in Bannock County, the court ruled 
evidence of prior misconduct could be admissible in this case, but that it could not 
"complete the requisite two-prong analysis because it is not aware of the details of the 
evidence sought to be introduced." (R., p.182.) Therefore, the court held that no 
evidence of allegations of abuse outside of Bear Lake County could be admitted without 
first having a hearing outside of the presence of the jury for the court to conduct the 
proper two-prong analysis. (R., p.182.) In relation to the defenses' request to prohibit 
other bad act evidence, the court ruled "[a]ny evidence of Defendant's criminal acts or 
bad acts pertaining to illegal drugs or controlled substances shall not be presented to 
the jury by any attorney or witness without the necessary hearing outside the presence 
of the jury." (R., p.184.) The court also noted the State would not be able to introduce 
such evidence even with a hearing unless the court is convinced it is being done for a 
proper purpose under404(b).2 (R., p.184.) 
The case ultimately proceeded to trial. During voir dire, while the parties 
exercised their peremptory challenges, a discussion between counsel and the court was 
held off the record. (Supp. Tr., p.217, Ls.8-9). The district court then determined that 
the parties were in agreement regarding who would be on the jury, the jurors' names 
were read, and the district court confirmed that the parties agreed with the jury 
designation. (Trial Tr., p.10, L.4 - p.11, L.19.) The jury was then sworn in and a half 
hour recess was taken. (Trial Tr., p.11, L.23, p.12, L.21 - p.13, L.5.) Prior to the jury 
being brought back in, defense counsel explained, "I don't want to waive that objection. 
2 The State's 404(b) notice never disclosed or cited "bad acts" related to the defendant's 
drug usage or drug charges. 
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So I'll make that, I guess, in the morning, your Honor." (Trial Tr., p.13, Ls.14-16.) The 
court responded, "I have it on the record as of now that you want to make an objection 
in the morning. We'll come back at 8:30 and allow you to do that. ... You are not waiving 
the objection." (Trial Tr., p.13, Ls.17-21.) 
Later, after the jury had left for the day, the court took up Mr. Erickson's 
objection. (Trial Tr., p.39, Ls.1-15.) Counsel for Mr. Erickson explained that he 
objected to the State's use of its peremptory challenges to only eliminate men from the 
jury, noting that the United States Supreme Court has held that you cannot disqualify 
jurors based on race or gender and that appeared to be what the state was doing. (Trial 
Tr., p.39, L.14 - p.40, L.6.) In response, the State argued that it did not believe that this 
was a constitutional basis to declare a mistrial and start over. (Trial Tr., p.40, 
L.19 - p.42, L.2.) After taking the evening to review the relevant case law, the district 
court denied the defense's objection, finding that, in this case, the jury did not end up 
being all of one type like in the United State's Supreme Court's decisions in Baston v. 
Kentucky or J.E.B. v. Arizona4 and that white males are not a protected class; 
therefore, in this case there was not a showing of discrimination by striking a protected 
class from the jury. (Trial Tr., p.43, Ls.3-12, p.60, Ls.24 - p.61, L.15.) 
During the trial, C.E., Mr. Erickson's daughter, testified that around the end of 
March 2004, she had come to St. Charles to visit her grandparents and father. (Trial 
Tr., p.83, Ls.4-9.) During her stay she slept in her Grandma and Grandpa, Margaret 
and Glade, Erickson's camper with her brother and Mr. Erickson. (Trial Tr., p.83, 
L.17 - p.84, L.7.) C.E., her brother, and Mr. Erickson all slept in the same bed. (Trial 
3 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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Tr., p.84, Ls.4-7.) She testified that Mr. Erickson "touched my boobs and my butt and 
asked me if I liked it how daddy touched me, and then I told him no, and that I wanted to 
go to bed." (Trial Tr., p.84, Ls.20-22.) She explained that Mr. Erickson touched her 
under her shirt, on her belly and breast, and then he rubbed her butt.5 (Trial Tr., p.84, 
L.23 - p.85, L.4.) She said she was approximately 10 years old at the time. (Trial 
Tr., p.85, Ls.11-12.) 
On cross-examination, counsel for Mr. Erickson had C.E. review her testimony 
from the preliminary hearing in this case, where she testified that this event occurred 
around the end of July 2004 and that she remembered that because it was after her 
birthday in July. (Trial Tr., p.88, Ls.4-15.) She agreed that that is what she had 
previously testified to under oath and answered affirmatively when asked if she was 
telling the truth at the preliminary hearing. (Trial Tr., p.88, Ls.10-24.) She also testified 
that when she was interviewed by Bright Tomorrows she told them that this touching 
had happened after her birthday on July 9, 2004. (Trial Tr., p.89, Ls.1-14.) When 
asked why her testimony had changed, C.E. testified that after she, her grandmother, 
her mother, and her sister thought about it, "we realized that it wasn't." (Trial Tr., p.89, 
Ls.18-23.) 
L.H., C.E.'s sister, testified that between 2001 and 2003, she was inappropriately 
touched by her step-father, Mr. Erickson. (Trial Tr., p.111, Ls.5-24.) She testified that 
the first instance occurred when she came home from school one day. (Trial Tr., p.111, 
L.20 - p.112, L.19.) She explained she was in the kitchen with Mr. Erickson and he 
4 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
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began touching her boobs and butt outside of her clothes. (Trial Tr., p.111, 
L.20 - p.113, L.5.) She also testified that in 2003, Mr. Erickson again touched her 
boobs and butt outside her clothing in the camper trailer behind Mr. Erickson's parents', 
Margaret and Glade Erickson's, house. (Tira! Tr., p.113, L.20 - p.115, L.11.) L.H. also 
testified that the touching continued from Bear Lake County when they moved to 
Pocatello, although she did not describe any specific instances. (Trial Tr., p.117, 
Ls.5-16.) L.H. admitted that she had previously reported that she does not remember 
everything and that her Grandma Snow and her mother Tammy Erickson remember 
more than her. (Trial Tr., p.122, L.22 - p.123, L.2, p.138, Ls.4-7.) 
When questioned further about spending time with Mr. Erickson in the summer of 
2003, L.H. stated that she did not spend time with him by herself. (Trial Tr., p.145, 
Ls.2-20.) The defense then asked, "[s]o the incidents in the trailer had to have occurred 
in 2002, to which L.H. responded "somewhere in that time frame yes." (Trial Tr., p.145, 
L.25 - p.146, L.2.) However, on rebuttal, L.H. clarified that she was living in St. Charles 
with Mr. Erickson and her mother part of 2003, prior to moving to Soda Springs with her 
mother when Mr. and Ms. Erickson separated later that year, but she did not recall 
anything taking place during that time period between her and her stepfather stating, "I 
wasn't home a lot, and no, I don't recall any." (Trial Tr., p.149, Ls.5-22.) 
The State later called Mydell Yeager, a licensed counselor who counsels victims 
of abuse, who testified regarding markers or dynamics of victim/offender relationships, 
(Trial Tr., p.189, L.13 - p.209, L.2.) The defense then called Dr. Danial Rybicki, a 
5 There was no testimony by C.E. regarding whether when Mr. Erickson allegedly 
touched C.E.'s butt, it was over or under her clothing. (Trial Tr., p.80, L.20 - p.109, 
L.15.) 
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psychologist who has practiced both clinical and forensic psychology in the area of child 
abuse. (Trial Tr., p.216, L.16 - p.218, L.24.) During his testimony Dr. Rybicki explained 
the various factors which might cause a child to falsely report and problems that occur 
during child abuse investigations, and analyzed the investigation in this case pointing 
out things that could have affected the reporting or could be an indication of a false 
report. (Trial Tr., p.232, L. 18 - p.295, L.20.) Dr. Rybicki did not testify regarding 
whether he thought L.H. or C.E. were abused or whether they were truthful. (Trial 
Tr., p.235, Ls.2-22.) 
As one of its witnesses, the defense called Detective Tony Vollmer from Bannock 
County, who initially investigated the case. (Trial Tr., p.388, L. 15 - p.399, L.13.) She 
testified regarding her investigation into L.H.'s accusations and to statements made by 
both L.H. and C.E. during her investigation that were contrary to what the girls testified 
to at trial. (Trial rr., p.388, L.15 - p.399, L.13.) During his cross-examination of 
Detective Vollmer, the prosecutor asked her whether she attempted to interview 
Mr. Erickson regarding the charges in this case. (Trial Tr., p.399, L.15 - p.400, L.13.) 
She explained that she had tried to set up an interview with Mr. Erickson, but he refused 
to speak with her regarding the allegations. (Trial Tr., p.399, L.15 - p.400, L. 13.) The 
prosecutor then verified that she was never able to get Mr. Erickson's version of event 
because "he never came in for an interview.'' (Trial Tr., p.399, L.15 - p.400, L.13.) 
The State subsequently called Tammy Erickson as a rebuttal witness. (Trial 
Tr., p.436, Ls.17-19.) Tammy Erickson testified regarding the incident where she, and 
her children, came to Mr. Erickson's and took the truck. (Trial Tr., p.437, L.10 - p.441, 
L.19.) During this line of questioning the State asked Tammy Erickson if she was 
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getting child support for the children. (Trial Tr., p.439, Ls.9-25.) Defense counsel 
immediately objected stating this was irrelevant and improper character evidence. (Trial 
Tr., p.439, Ls.9-25.) After the State argued that it was simply trying to show her 
desperate need for a vehicle, the district court overruled the objection, and Tammy 
Erickson was allowed to testify that she was not receiving any child support. (Trial 
Tr., p.439, Ls.19-25.) Defense counsel also objected to the prosecutor asking Tammy 
Erickson, "So you were unaware that the sheriff's office simply had lost that file and had 
not proceeded," noting this was hearsay and submitting or assuming facts not in 
evidence. (Trial Tr., p.459, Ls.10-14.) The district court allowed the question to be 
answered. (Trial Tr., p.459, Ls.15-18.) 
The State and defense then presented their closing arguments. At the close of 
the State's rebuttal, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved for a 
mistrial based on the State's repeated vouching for the witnesses during his closing 
arguments. (Trial Tr., p.527, L.25 - p.528, L.25.) The district court delayed ruling on 
the motion to see what the verdict was. (Trial Tr., p.529, Ls.18-22.) 
At approximately 4:30 in the afternoon, the case was submitted to the jury. 
{R., p.234.) At 9:38 that night, the jury returned with a verdict of guilty of sexual abuse 
of a child an counts one and two and not guilty on count three. (R., pp.234, 248-50.) 
Counsel for Mr. Erickson renewed his motion for a mistrial, and the district court stated it 
would allow the closing argument to be transcribed and briefing to be filed. (Trial 
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Tr., p.540, L.8 - p.545, L. 1.) Following briefing from both sides, the district court denied 
Mr. Erickson's motion for a mistrial.6 (R., pp.272-85.) 
Mr. Erickson filed a Notice of Appeal from the district court's Decision on Motion 
for Mistrial. (R., pp.286-88.) Mr. Erickson was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 
fifteen years, with three years fixed, to be served concurrently with his sentence of 
seven years, with three years fixed in Bear Lake County Case CR-2007-1253. (Trial 
Tr., p.547, Ls.3-9, p.562, Ls.9-19; R., pp.300-01.) Following Mr. Erickson's sentencing, 
counsel for Mr. Erickson filed an Amended Notice of Appeal. (Trial Tr., p.563, L.23 -
p.564, L.10; R., p.296-98.) 
6 Because Mr. Erickson's objection to the prosecutorial misconduct in this case was 
made after the case was submitted to the jury, thereby making it reviewable only for 
fundamental error, the denial of Mr. Erickson's motion for mistrial is not being pursued 
separately in this appeal. Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 252 P.2d 971 (1952) 
([O]rdinarily an objection comes too late for the purpose of review on appeal, if made for 
the first time after the jury has retired or the cause has been submitted to them, or after 
the close of the arguments .... "); State v. Lute, 108 Idaho 905, 702 P.2d 1365 (1985) 
(reviewing the untimely objected to prosecutorial misconduct for fundamental error 
when reviewing the denial of his motion for mistrial). Instead, the prosecutorial 
misconduct alleged in this motion has been argued in section ll(C)(3), along with other 
unobjected to misconduct that was not included in the motion for mistrial, but 
Mr. Erickson contends constitutes fundamental error. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the State violate Mr. Erickson's and the jurors' right to equal protection when 
it used its peremptory challenges to only strike men from the jury? 
2. Did the prosecutor's misconduct in this case violate Mr. Erickson's rights to due 
process and a fair trial? 
3. Were Mr. Erickson's rights to due process and to be free from self incrimination 
violated when the State elicited testimony from Detective Vollmer that 
Mr. Erickson refused to come in for an interview? 
4. Did the district court commit reversible error when it admitted evidence of prior 
bad acts of the defendant? 
5. Did the repeated misconduct and the erroneous admission of evidence in this 




The State Violated Mr. Erickson's And The Jurors' Rights To Equal Protection When It 
Used Its Peremptory Challenges To Only Strike Men From The Jury 
A. Introduction 
This case presents an issue never before decided by the Idaho Supreme Court 
regarding the timing of an objection to a party's use of peremptory challenges pursuant 
to Batson v. Kentucky. It also potentially presents issues of first impression in Idaho 
regarding whether the opposing party must object to the timelines of a Batson challenge 
below and whether, absent a timely objection, a Batson violation can be reviewed for 
fundamental error. Mr. Erickson contends he made a timely objection to the State's 
peremptory challenges, and even if he did not, the State's failure to object below to the 
timeliness of the challenge below waives the State's ability to raise this defense on 
appeal. Finally, if his Batson challenge is deemed untimely, Mr. Batson contends the 
prosecutor's actions in this case should be reviewed for fundamental error. 
Mr. Erickson asserts the State violated his constitutional right to equal protection when it 
used its peremptory challenges to exclude only men from the jury. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The determination of whether peremptory challenges have been exercised in a 
discriminatory manner presents a mixed issue of law and fact. It is ultimately a claim 
grounded in constitutional principles over which the appellate court exercises free 
review. See State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159,161, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169 (2000); State v. 
Hansen, 127 Idaho 675, 678, 904. P.2d 945, 948 (Ct. App. 1995). However, when 
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assessing the district's court's findings regarding the State's explanations for its 
peremptory challenges on appeal, the district court's findings will only be overturned if 
they are clearly erroneous in light of the facts as a whole. State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 
87, 856 P.2d 872, 877 (1993). 
C. The State Violated Mr. Erickson's And The Jurors' Rights To Equal Protection 
When It Used Its Peremptory Challenges To Only Strike Men From The Jury 
In Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court established a three step 
inquiry to determine if peremptory challenges have been exercised in a discriminatory 
manner. 476 U.S. 79, 93-94 (1986). See also Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 
(2005); State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 87, 856 P.2d 872, 877 (1993); State v. Owen, 129 
Idaho 920, 932, 935 P.2d 183, 195 (Ct. App.1997). First, the defendant must make a 
prima facia showing that "the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of 
discriminatory purpose." Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94; Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87, 856 P.2d 
at 877. Next, if the defendant has established a prima facia case, the burden shifts to 
the State to adequately explain the exclusion by offering a race or gender neutral 
justification for its strikes. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94; J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 141 
(1994); Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87, 856 P.2d at 877. Lastly, if a race or gender neutral 
reason is offered for the challenge, the district court must then determine whether that 
explanation overcomes the inference of discrimination established by the defendant's 
prima facia showing. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87, 856 P.2d at 877. 
Although Batson initially only applied to racial discrimination, in J.E.B. v. 
Alabama, the United States Supreme Court extended · Batson to cases of gender 
discrimination as well noting, "[djiscrimination in jury selection, whether based on race 
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or on gender, causes harm to the litigants, the community and the individual jurors who 
are wrongfully excluded from participation in the judicial process." 511 U.S. at 140. 
Furthermore, in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), the United States Supreme Court 
found that the juror's right to equal protection is also at issue when the State uses their 
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner, and, even though it is the juror's 
right to equal protection, the defendant still has standing to assert the equal protection 
claim of an excluded juror. Powers, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
In J.E.B., much like the case at issue, the State used all but one of its peremptory 
challenges to strike only men from the jury. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129. The court 
explained that "[w]hen state actors exercise peremptory challenges in reliance on 
gender stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative abilities of 
men and women." Id. at 140. Such discrimination creates the potential for cynicism, 
particularly in cases such as rape, sexual harassment, and paternity, where 
gender-related issues are prominent. Id. This can create the impression that the 
judicial system has acquiesced to keeping one gender from fully participating or that the 
'"deck has been stacked' in favor of one side." Id. 
Here, during the portion of the hearing where the parties exercised their 
peremptory challenges, a discussion between counsel and the court was held off the 
record. (Supp. Tr., p.217, Ls.8-9). The district court then determined that the parties 
were in agreement regarding who would be on the jury, the jurors' names were read, 
and the district court confirmed with the parties that they agreed with the jury 
designation. (Trial Tr., p.10, L.4 - p.11, L.19.) The jury was sworn in and a half hour 
recess was taken. (Trial Tr., p.11, L.23, p.12, L.21 - p.13, l.5.) Prior to the jury being 
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brought back in defense counsel stated, "I don't want to waive that objection. So I'll 
make that, I guess, in the morning, your Honor." (Trial Tr., p.13, Ls.14-16.) The court 
responded, "I have it on the record as of now that you want to make an objection in the 
morning. We'll come back at 8:30 and allow you to do that.. .. You are not waiving the 
objection." (Trial Tr., p.13, Ls.17-21.) Later, after the jury had left for the day, the court 
took up Mr. Erickson's objection. (Trial Tr., p.39, Ls.1-15.) 
Because it is not clear from the record on appeal, whether the Batson challenge 
was made prior to the jury being sworn, this Court must consider whether Mr. Erickson's 
challenge was untimely based on the Idaho Court of Appeals' holding in State v. 
Hansen, 127 Idaho 675, 904 P.2d 945 (Ct. App. 1995), finding that for a Batson 
challenge to be timely, "a Batson motion must be made before the jury is sworn, or it is 
waived" for the purposed of appeal. Id. at 678, 904 P.2d at 948. Therefore, in this 
case, the inquiry must begin with whether Mr. Erickson made a timely objection to the 
State's use of its peremptory challenges. Mr. Erickson contends his objection was 
timely made and his challenge should be considered on appeal. Furthermore, the State 
.violated his and the jurors' right to equal protection, when it used its peremptory 
challenges to only exclude men from the jury. 
1. Mr. Erickson's Batson Challenge Should Be Considered On Appeal 
The timeliness of when a Batson challenge must be made is an issue which has 
never been addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. Mr. Erickson asserts that he made 
a timely objection preserving the issue for appeal. Alternatively, if Mr. Erickson's 
objection is deemed untimely, this case presents two issues of first impression. First, 
whether the State can now object to timeliness on appeal absent an objection below, 
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and second, whether fundamental error should be applied to review the prosecutor's 
discriminatory use of his peremptory challenges in this case. 
Mr. Erickson contends his objection should be deemed to have been timely 
made. Furthermore, the State should be foreclosed from challenging the timeliness of 
his objection because it failed to object below. Finally, even if Mr. Erickson's objection 
is found to be untimely, this Court should review the State's exercise of peremptory 
challenges for fundamental error in this case. 
a. Mr. Erickson Made A Timely Objection Below: Therefore. This 
Issue ls Preserved For Appeal 
In Fordv. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991), the United States Supreme Court noted 
that the State's were given the discretion to determine when an objection must be made 
to be timely under Batson, provided such a determination comported with the United 
States Supreme Court standards for assessing the adequacy of independent state 
procedural grounds to bar Constitutional claims. Ford, 498 U.S. at 423-24. 
Mr. Erickson urges this Court to find that his objection in this case was timely made. 
The only case to address the timeliness of a Batson challenge in Idaho has been 
State v. Hansen. 127 Idaho 675, 904 P.2d 945 (Ct. App. 1995). In Hansen, the 
defendant's challenge under Batson was granted and the entire panel was struck after 
the State used ten out of eleven peremptory challenges to remove men from the panel. 
Id. at 677, 904 P.2d at 947. On appeal, the defendant argued that his retrial should 
have been barred based on double jeopardy grounds because the mistrial was declared 
after the jury was sworn. Id. Both below and on appeal, the State argued that the 
Batson challenge was untimely and should not have been granted. Id. at 677-78, 904 
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P.2d at 947-48. The Court of Appeals ultimately held that double jeopardy did not bar 
retrial because the defense had made the motion for mistrial and that any error in 
granting the Batson challenge was irrelevant because the State was able to retry the 
defendant. Id. at 678-79, 904 P.2d at 948-49. To give guidance to the trial bench and 
bar, in making its ruling the Court of Appeals also held that a Batson challenge made 
after the jury is sworn is untimely, waiving the issue on appeal. Id. at 678, 904 P.2d at 
948. 
Mr. Erickson contends that the authority relied upon by the Court in Hansen to 
reach this decision is not applicable to a challenge under Batson; therefore, Hansen 
should not be followed. Furthermore, this Court should apply a standard that at the very 
least allows an objection to made within a reasonable time after the jury has been 
sworn. 
i. This Court Should Not Adopt The Reasoning In Hansen 
In Hansen the Court of Appeals noted that other jurisdictions have specifically 
held that a Batson challenge must be made before the jury is sworn or it is untimely and 
waived for appeal.7 Hansen, 127 Idaho at 678, 904 P.2d at 948. See a/so State v. 
7 The Court of Appeals was correct that other jurisdictions have required a Batson 
objection to be made prior to the jury being sworn (or the venire dismissed). See 
McCroryv. Henderson, 82 F.3d 1243, 1244 (2d. Cir. 1996); United States v. Parham, 16 
F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir.1994);United States v. Cashwell, 950 F.2d 699, 704 (11th 
Cir.1992); United States v. Masat, 948 F.2d 923, 927 (5th Cir.1991); Government of 
Virgin Islands v. Forte, 806 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1986); Ross v. State, 581 So.2d 495 
(Ala.1991); State v. Harris, 157 Ariz. 35,754 P.2d 1139 (1988); Pacee v. State, 306Ark. 
563, 816 S.W.2d 856 (1991); People v. Thompson, 50 Cal.3d 134, 785 P.2d 857 
(1990); State v. Robinson, 237 Conn. 238, 676 a.2d 384 (1996); Tursio v. U.S., 634 
A.2d 1205 (D. C. Ct. App. 1993); State v Castillo, 486 So.2d 565 (Fla.1986); People v. 
Andrews, 132 111.2d 451, 548 N.E. 2d 1025; Simmons v. Commonwealth, 746 S.W.2d 
393; Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 542 A.2d 1267 (1988); Thomas v. State, 517 So.2d 
1285 (Miss. 1987); State v. Parker, 836 S.E.2d 930 (Mo. 1992); State v. Parrish, 327 
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Jones, 218 Wis.2d 599, 602, 581 N.W.2d 561 (1998) (stating "[m]ost courts have held 
that a Batson challenge is timely if it is raised prior to the swearing of the jury or the 
dismissal of the venire" and citing cases from these jurisdictions). The Court of Appeals 
then cited I.C. § 19-2006, which requires that a challenge to the jury panel must be 
taken before a juror is sworn, must be in writing, and must plainly and distinctly state the 
grounds for the challenge, to support its finding that this standard should also apply in 
Idaho. Hansen, 127 Idaho at 678, 904 P.2d at 948 (quoting I.C. § 19-2006). The Court 
also noted that challenges to the jury panel or an individual juror because of errors or 
discrimination during the jury selection process must be made prior to the jury being 
empanelled citing the Court of Appeals previous decisions in State v. Yon, 115 Idaho 
907, 771 P.2d 925 (Ct. App. 1989) and State v. Ruybal, 102 Idaho 885, 643 P.2d 835 
(Ct. App. 1982). Id. 
Mr. Erickson contends that the authority relied upon by the Court of Appeals is 
not applicable to a challenge under Batson and should not be applied in this case. First, 
although § 19-2006 does state that "[a] challenge to the panel must be taken before a 
juror is sworn, and must be in writing, and must plainly and distinctly state the facts 
constituting the ground of the challenge" it does not apply and should not apply to 
objections made pursuant to Batson. I.C. § 19-2006. 
Idaho Code section 19-2004 defines a challenge to the panel as "an objection 
Mont. 88, 111 P.3d 671 (Mont. 2005); State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 
(1986); State v. Wilson, 117 N.M. 11, 868 P.2d 656 (Ct. App. 1993); People v. Harris, 
151 A.D.2d 961,542 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1989); State v. Jones, 293 S.C. 54,358 S.E.2d 701 
(1987), overruled on other grounds by State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302,454 S.E.2d 317 
(1995); State v. Peck, 719 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn.Crim.App.1986); Taylor v. State, 825 
S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Ct. App.1992); State v. Rosa-Re, 190 P.3d 1259 (Utah 2008). 
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made to all the jurors returned" and section § 19-2003 defines that panel as "a list of the 
jurors returned by a sheriff to serve at a particular court or for the trial of a particular 
action." I.C. §§ 19-2003, 19-2004. Therefore, § 19-2006 envisions a challenge to the 
entire panel drawn. Furthermore, the language "before a juror is sworn" seems to 
indicate this type of challenge must be made prior to the jurors being sworn to conduct 
voir dire, rather than prior to the jury panel being sworn. Compare I.C. § 19-2006 with 
§ 19-2012 ("[l]f he intends to challenge an individual juror he must do so before the jury 
is sworn."} and§ 19-2014 (explaining that a peremptory or for cause challenge "must be 
taken before the jury is sworn to try the case."); See also§ 19-2013 (explaining the two 
types of challenges to individual jurors). Finally, Idaho Code§ 19-2029 lists the order in 
which challenges for cause must take place, noting a challenge to the entire panel, must 
come before challenges for cause to individual jurors and Idaho Code § 19-2030 
explains that after the panel has been passed for cause, the parties can make their 
peremptory challenges. §§ 19-2029, 19-2030. Therefore, Mr. Erickson contends that 
neither § 19-2006, nor any other section in title 19 chapter 20 of the Idaho Code, is 
applicable to objections made to an opposing party's use of his peremptory challenges. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals' prior opinions in Ruybal and Yon are 
distinguishable from the issue at hand. Ruybal dealt with a challenge to the selection 
process of the entire panel that was raised for the first time on appeal. Ruybal, 102 
Idaho at 887-88, 643 P.2d at 837-38. Yon involved an objection raised after the verdict 
was given that the jury was prejudiced by statements made by one of the jurors during 
voir dire. Yon, 115 Idaho at 909, 771 P.2d at 927. In fact, in Ruybal, the Court noted 
that the applicable statutes related to challenging a jury panel because the venire was 
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not selected properly, "contemplate that a party should use reasonable diligence in 
asserting his rights" and that in Ruybal failing to raise the issue until appeal was not 
reasonable diligence. Ruybal, 102 Idaho at 887-88, 643 P.2d at 837-38. Here, 
Mr. Erickson did use reasonable diligence in asserting his rights, attempting to place his 
objection on the record prior to the jury returning from their recess right after they were 
sworn and before opening statements were given. 
Therefore, Mr. Erickson contends that the Court of Appeals' Opinion in Hansen 
should not apply in this case and this Court should not follow the reasoning articulated 
by the Court of Appeals because the statutes and case law cited by the Court of 
Appeals are not relevant to the inquiry at hand. 
ii. This Court Should Adopt A Standard That Allows Objections 
Pursuant To Batson To Made Within A Reasonable Time 
In United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit 
allowed an objection based on Batson to be heard immediately after the jury had been 
sworn. 827 F.2d at 1257. In reaching its decision, the Court noted it was unpersuaded 
that the objection had to be made prior to the jury being sworn stating, "the 
prosecution's peremptory challenges might not have been apparent until the jury was 
selected, so the objection could not...have been raised much earlier." Id. The court 
also noted that the State suffered no prejudice from the delay. Id. Because it was the 
defendant who moved for the mistrial, double jeopardy would not have barred retrial. Id. 
Likewise, in United States v. Contreras-Contreras, 83 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1996), the 
Ninth Circuit again reiterated "[tjhe case law is clear that a Batson objection must be 
made as soon as possible, and preferably before the jury is sworn." 83 F.3d at 1104. 
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See also Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 948 F.2d 532, 534 {9th Cir.1991) (stating, in a 
wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of severe emotional distress case, "that 
Batson objections must occur as soon as possible, preferably before the jury is sworn"). 
The case at hand is very similar to Thompson. Although we don't know for sure 
whether an objection was raised prior to the jury being sworn, a discussion was held off 
the record while the peremptory challenges were being exercised. An objection was put 
on the record, or attempted to be put on the record, after the jury was sworn, a break 
was taken, and the court reconvened. At that time, counsel for Mr. Erickson explained 
that he had an objection to make on the record, and that he did not want it to be waived. 
The district court instructed that the matter would be taken up in the morning and the 
issue would not be waived. At the very least, an objection was placed or attempted to 
be place on the record as soon as there was an opportunity outside the presence of the 
jury. Furthermore, what was placed on the record indicates that this was not the first 
time the objection was brought up, but rather the first time it was placed on the record. 
Therefore, Mr. Erickson urges this Court to adopt a similar standard to that in Thompson 
and find that his objection was timely and should be considered on appeal. 
b. The State Waived Any Objection To The Timeliness Of 
Mr. Erickson's Batson Challenge By Failing To Object Below 
Even if Mr. Erickson's Batson objection is considered untimely, it should still be 
considered on appeal because the State failed to object to the timeliness below. Unlike 
Hansen, where the State objected to the timeliness of the Batson challenge below, in 
this case, when asked to respond the State never claimed that Mr. Erickson's challenge 
was untimely. (Compare Trial Tr., p.40, L.19- p.42, L.2 with Hansen, 127 Idaho at 677, 
904 P.2d at 947.) 
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Although this issue has never been addressed in Idaho, other jurisdictions have 
required the opposing party to object to the timeliness of the Batson challenge below 
before timeliness will be considered on appeal. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
held that "just as a Batson challenge must be made timely or it will be rejected, an 
objection to the timeliness of a Batson challenge must likewise be made timely or it will 
be rejected. Garcia v. Excel Corp., 102 F.3d 758, 759 (5th Cir. 1997). Similarly, the 
Illinois Supreme Court has held that the opposing party must make an objection to the 
timeliness of a Batson challenge below otherwise the issue is waived for appeal. 
People v. Henderson, 142 111.2d 258, 283, 568 N.E. 2d 1234 (Ill. 1990) overruling on 
grounds by People v. Terry, 182 111.2d 298, 700 N.E. 2d 992 (Ill. 1998); People v. Harris, 
192111.2d 123,171,544 N.E. 2d 357,378 (1989); but see State v. Goldsby, 845 S.W.2d 
636 (Mo.App. E.D. 1992) (rejecting appellant's argument that the State should not be 
able to argue for the first time on appeal that appellant's Batson claim was untimely). 
Requiring the party opposing the Batson challenge to raise timelienss below 
would help prevent the situation at hand and provide notice to the defendant and the 
district court that a record needs to be made regarding the timeliness of the challenge. 
ff the State had objected to the timeliness below in this case, a record could have been 
made regarding when defense counsel first raised this issue before the district court and 
the district court could have made a finding regarding the timeliness. Furthermore, the 
State's silence in this case could be because the objection was raised while the parties 
were exercising their peremptory challenges off the record and the prosecutor knew an 
objection had been properly made. Therefore, Mr. Erickson contends this Court should 
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require that any objection to the timeliness of a party's Batson challenge must be made 
by the opponent below, otherwise the challenge will be deemed timely on appeal. 
c. The State's Violation Of Mr. Erickson's Right To Equal Protection 
By Removing Only Men From The Jury Should Be Reviewed For 
Fundamental Error 
Finally, Mr. Erickson contends that even if his Batson challenge is considered 
untimely and the State did not have to .object to the timeliness below, the State's 
violation of Mr. Erickson's right to equal protection under Batson and J.E.B. should still 
be reviewed for fundamental error in this case. Fundamental error is error that goes to 
the foundation or basis of the defendant's rights, the foundation of the case, or takes 
from the defendant a right which is essential to his defense and which he cannot or 
should not be permitted to waive. State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 677, 67 P.3d 
1283, 1289 (2003) (noting the term "plain error" emobodies the concept of "fundamental 
error" in the context of criminal cases). 
Although no cases in Idaho have specifically addressed whether an untimely 
Batson challenge can be reviewed for fundamental error, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
has previously reviewed actions that occurred during the jury selections process for 
fundamental error. In State v. Yon, the Idaho Court of Appeals reviewed a juror's 
remark during voir dire to determine whether the statement affected the deliberations of 
the other jurors to such an extent as to deprive the defendant of a right to a fair trial. 
Yon, at 909, 771 P.Zd at 927. 
Mr. Erickson also encourages this Court to look to other jurisdictions which have 
reviewed Batson violations for fundamental error as persuasive authority. In Contreras-
Contreras, the Ninth Circuit reviewed an untimely Batson challenge for "plain error." 83 
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-
F.3d 1103. In that case the prosecutor volunteered to the district court that he intended 
to strike two African-American jurors and his reasoning. Id. at 1104-05. Although the 
defense did not object to these strikes or the reason offered for these strikes, the Ninth 
Circuit reviewed the case for plain error, finding that the reasons offered by the State for 
its peremptory challenges were not plain error. Id. Similarly, other federal circuits and 
State courts have also applied plain error review absent a timely Batson objection. See 
United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109 (ih Cir. 1998); Hidalgo v. Fagen, Inc., 206 
F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2000); State v. Ballew, 76 Ohio St 3d 244, 253, 667 N.E.2d 369, 
379 (Ohio 1996) (failing to raise Batson objection at trial, waived "all but plain error"); 
but see James v. Bowersox, 187 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 1999); State v. Holder, 155 Ariz. 83, 
85, 745 P.2d 141, 143 (1987); Williams v. State, 773 S.W.2d 525 (Texas Crim. App. 
1988). 
Mr. Erickson contends the Batson violation in this case was clear from the record 
and demonstrates fundamental error. When making his objection to the State's use of 
its peremptory challenges, counsel for Mr. Erickson explained that the defense objected 
to the disqualification of only males by the State. (Trial Tr., p.39, Ls.14-15. He went on 
to explain: 
We believe that violates-and I don't have the case right offhand, 
but there was a Supreme Court case that said you cannot disqualify jurors 
based solely on races [sic] and gender and sex and race. I think those 
cases were race cases, but we think it applies equally to gender. We 
notice that all the prempts by the State were males. Not one female 
among the whole, and this is an exceptionally large amount of 
prempts .... We have 10. They passed on one, so they ended up bumping 
nine males ... by passing, why they actually did bump one female. And it 
appears like it is a sex bias orientation of the jury, an attempt to 
manipulate the jury in that fashion, and we would object based on the 
State's selection in that regard. 
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(Trial Tr., p.39, L.14 - p.40, L.6.) The district court then asked the State if it had a 
response, to which it responded: 
We have no response, your Honor. We just don't think that it's a 
constitutional basis to declare a mistrial and start over. He cites no 
authority. I am not aware of any authority. I think maybe the argument 
would have some clarity and perhaps some status if we ended up with a 
jury that was all female. And now we're looking at a jury that's 
substantially all female. We got a jury here, as I recall, pretty much split 
on gender lines. I think half of them are males and half of them are 
females. We just simply exercise our prernpts as we determine based 
upon the voir dires and based upon the questionnaire we felt best favored 
the State. If that turned out to be males, that just simply because we 
made that judgment that we didn't wind up with an all male jury, we 
didn't end up with an all female jury. 
We just felt we need a jury of parents and we kind of focused on 
getting parents. We wanted some grandparents on there, but we didn't 
really care whether they were fathers, mothers, grandmas, or 
grandfathers. And the result would have been, Gee whiz, we got this 
entire jury that's all males, or all females, then maybe ... . But I don't 
think there is a presumption that because somebody stuck all men or 
struck all women that therefore we have a gender bias and prejudice 
which is unconstitutional therefore we should start over. 
(Trial Tr., p.40, L.19- p.42, L.2.) Counsel for Mr. Erickson again explained why he felt 
that the State was excluding jurors based on their sex, explaining that there is a 
grandmother testifying and two girls "and it's the State's obvious intent to try and get as 
many females on the jury as possible." (Trial Tr., p.42, Ls.7-12.) He noted that if the 
pool had been 50/50 to begin with, they probably would have ended up with an all 
female jury; however, because the pool weighed in favor of men, they ended up with 
roughly a 50/50 split. (Trial Tr., p.42, Ls.12-18.) He explained, "I can't see any other 
obvious ground on which they can base [their preempts] on .... you wouldn't hit nine 
out of 10 like that by mere happenchance, mere fortuity." (Trial Tr., p.42, Ls.19-25.) 
Mr. Erickson clearly demonstrated an inference of a discriminatory purpose in the 
State's peremptory challenges. See Johnson, 545 U.S. at 169. Additionally, the State 
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offered no individualized gender-neutral explanation for its use of challenges. See id. at 
169-71. The general explanation that was given indicates that gender was used in 
determining which peremptory challenges to exercise, admitting that it exercised its 
prempts in the manner that best favored the State and "[i]f it turned out to be males, that 
just simply because we made that judgment that we didn't wind up with an all male jury, 
we didn't end up with an all female jury." (Trial Tr., p.40, L.19 - p.42, L.2.) Therefore, 
Mr. Erickson contends the State's discriminatory use of its peremptory challenges in this 
case amounted to fundamental error. 
2. The District Court Erred When It Found That The State Did Not Use Its 
Peremptory Challenges In A Discriminatory Manner To Exclude Only Men 
From The Jury 
Finally, if Mr. Erickson's Batson challenge is reviewed on appeal, Mr. Erickson 
contends the district court erred when it found that the State did not use its peremptory 
challenges in a discriminatory manner. Prior to ruling on Mr. Erickson's Batson 
challenge, The district court took the evening to read the case law. (Trial Tr., p.43, Ls.3-
12.) The next morning, without further argument from counsel for Mr. Erickson or the 
State, the district court denied the motion. (Trial Tr., p.61, Ls.2-7, 14-15.) The district 
court cited Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Arizona stating, "the problem I have with 
both Batson and JEB is they are situations where the jury ended up being all of one 
type. We don't have that in this situation." (Trial Tr., p.60, Ls.2-4.) The court explained 
the jury consisted of eight men and five women and that the panel started out with 36 
men and 28 women; therefore, he did not see any kind of "disproportionate percentage" 
and was "not prepared to say that it's a discriminatory panel." (Trial Tr., p.60, Ls.2-9.) 
Later the district court clarified the number of men and women on the jury stating there 
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were actually seven men and six women serving on the jury. (Trial Tr., p.67, Ls.6-9.) In 
making its ruling, the district court then cited State v. Owen, noting that in finding that a 
white woman had the right to challenge the removal of two native Americans from the 
jury, the court said she did and that "it wasn't her equal protection that was at issue, it 
was the two Native Americans equal protection that was at issue." (Trial Tr., p.60, 
Ls.10-19.) The district court went on to find that "[i]n this case, I don't believe that white 
males are a protected class. So I don't think they have any constitutional issues to raise 
by the fact that there was all men kicked off the jury." (Trial Tr., p.60, L.25 - p.61, L.3.) 
The district court found that "there has not been a showing of discrimination by striking a 
protected class from the jury panel, and so I'm going to deny the motion on that 
ground." (Trial Tr., p.61, Ls.3-7.) 
The district court's finding that white men are not a protected class and that this 
case was distinguishable from Batson and J.E.B. because the panel did not consist of 
all women were erroneous. As the United State's Supreme Court noted in J.E.B. each 
juror has a right to be free from discrimination because of the their gender. 511 U.S. at 
140. This right exists regardless of the final results of the panel and regardless of 
whether it is only white men being challenged. See id generally. 
Additionally, a correct application of the three part test articulated in Batson 
demonstrates that Mr. Erickson clearly established a prima facia case of gender based 
motivation by noting that the State only struck men with nine challenges. Although, the 
jury panel itself favored men, this was only slight, with 36 men and 28 women, a 9:7 
ratio. (Trial Tr., p.60, Ls.2-9.) Thus, the defense easily satisfied the first part of the 
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inquiry, by demonstrating a prima facia case of gender discrimination based on the 
State's using all nine of its challenges on men. 
Second, the rationale offered by the State clearly indicates it had gender in mind 
when it was at least making some of the peremptory challenges. (Trial Tr., p.40, L.19 -
p.42, L.2.) The State offered no individualized gender-neutral explanation for its use of 
challenges and the general explanation that was given indicates that gender was used 
in determining which peremptory challenges to exercise. The State admitted that it 
exercised its prempts in the manner that best favored the State and if that ended up 
being against only men that was because the State did not want to have an all female 
jury. (Trial Tr., p.40, L.19 - p.42, L.2.) As noble as it seems to try to make sure the jury 
represents a cross-section of the community, if a prosecutor exercises his challenges 
based upon a juror's gender or race he is violating the jurors' right to equal protection. 
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140. 
Therefore, the State's use of its peremptory challenges to eliminate only male 
jurors from the jury pool was a clear violation of Batson, violating Mr. Erickson's and the 
jurors' right to equal protection. 
A 
fl. 
Mr. Erickson's Rights To Due Process And A Fair Trial Were Violated By The 
Prosecutorial Misconduct Committed In This Case 
Introduction 
In this case, the prosecutor's misconduct, which began during the prosecutor's 
opening statements, continued while he was questioning witnesses, and reached its 
peak during closing arguments, deprived Mr. Erickson of his right to a fair trial and his 
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right to due process of law. See U.S. Const. amends VI, XIV; Idaho Const., art. I§ 13. 
The State's case hinged on the testimony of the alleged victims in this case, and the 
credibility of their accusations of sexual misconduct against Mr. Erickson. Based on 
these allegations, Mr. Erickson was convicted of two counts of sexual abuse of a minor. 
Unfortunately, the State's misconduct throughout the trial and closing arguments 
contributed to this conviction. 
During trial, the prosecutor was allowed to introduce facts not in evidence, over 
objection. The prosecutor also ignored the district court's ruling that bad act evidence 
related to Mr. Erickson's drug use must be taken up outside the presence of the jury 
before it could be brought in. Furthermore, the opening and closing statements 
included many instances of prosecutorial misconduct, including vouching, again 
referring to information not in evidence, misstating or attempting to shift the burden of 
proof, and appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury.8 Therefore, 
Mr. Erickson contends that this repeated and extensive misconduct deprived him of his 
right to a fair trial and his conviction should be reversed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in constitutional principles; 
therefore, they involve questions of law over which the appellate court exercises free 
review. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 273, 77 P.3d 956, 962 (2003) ("Constitutional 
issues ... are questions of law over which this Court exercised free review."). 
8 Mr. Erickson has attached the prosecutor's opening and closing arguments as an 




Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Committed Throughout Mr. Erickson's Trial, 
Denying Mr. Erickson Of His Rights To Due Process And A Fair Trial 
When a contemporaneous objection has been made to the prosecutor's 
misconduct, the appellate court will determine factually if misconduct has occurred, and 
if so, whether the misconduct was harmless. Stat/3 v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 
P.3d 273, 285 (2007). Absent an objection below, prosecutorial misconduct will only be 
reviewed for fundamental error. Id. Idaho Courts have noted that when reviewing 
fundamental error, each case will "stand on its own merits" and "[o]ut of the facts in 
each case will arise the law." State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 470, 163 P.3d 
1175, 1182 (2007) (quoting State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415,423, 776 P.2d 424 432 
(1989)). 
Therefore, when reviewing the objected to misconduct, this Court must determine 
whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred and whether it was harmless. Field, 122 
Idaho at 571, 165 P .3d at 285. When reviewing misconduct that was not objected to, 
this Court must first determine whether it was fundamental error. Id. A fundamental 
error is one that '"so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and 
deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due process."' Christiansen at 470, 
163 P.2d at 1182 (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 281, 77 P.3d 956, 970 
(2003); State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991)). It has been 
defined as an error which "goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or. .. to 
the foundation of the case or take[s] from the defendant a right which was essential to 
his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive." Id. (quoting 
State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415,423, 776 P.2d 424,432 (1989)). 
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Here, the only objected to misconduct occurred during the course of trial when 
the prosecutor questioned Tammy Erickson regarding information not in evidence, and 
when the prosecutor violated the district court's prior ruling that bad act evidence must 
be taken up outside of the jury before it could be admitted. Additionally, the numerous 
instance of prosecutorial misconduct in the opening and closing arguments, although 
not objected to, arise to fundamental error. 
1. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Argued Facts Not In 
Evidence Over Objection And When He Again Referred To These "Facts" 
In Closing Argument 
It is improper for the prosecutor to refer to or place before the jury facts not in 
evidence. State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166, 610 P.2d 522, 525 {1980) overruled on 
other grounds by State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387,630 P.2d 647; State v. Phillips, 144 
Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. Here, while questioning Tammy Erickson on rebuttal 
about Mr. Erickson telling her that the charges have been dropped because of lack of 
evidence, the prosecutor asked Tammy Erickson, "So you were unaware that the 
sheriff's office simply had lost that file and had not proceeded?" (Trial Tr., p.459, Ls.10-
14.) Counsel for Mr. Erickson immediately objected, stating that this was hearsay and 
was submitting or assuming facts not in evidence. {Trial Tr., p. 459, Ls.10-14.) The 
district court stated that it was not a statement and allowed the question to be 
answered, thereby overruling the objection. {Trial Tr., p.459, Ls.15-18.) However, no 
evidence had ever been presented by either party that the sheriff's office has lost the file 
and that is why they did not proceed on charges in this case. 
This same evidence was also referred to by the State in both its opening and 
closing statements; although no testimony was presented. In the opening statements, 
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the prosecutor argued, "You are seeing these children years after the incident. Some of 
that because they didn't report it timely, some of that burden falls upon us." (Trial 
Tr., p.26, Ls.22-25 (emphasis added).) The prosecutor went on to explain: 
They contacted our law enforcement sheriff's office and the deputy 
that was assigned to that simply dropped it, stood there for more than 
three years. When they inquired what had become of it, it got turned over 
to Deputy Marinez. Martinez contacted my office and three years later we 
start trying to locate these victims. Try to re-interview them, trying to talk 
to them. Trying to go back. That was our mistake. Believe me, I have 
apologized to them. I've apologized to the parents and loved ones. It 
should not have happened, but it did happen. 
(Trial Tr., p.27, Ls.4-15.). 
However, Deputy Martinez was never called as a witness and the State never 
attempted to put this information into evidence. (See Trial Tr., Index pp.A-C.) The only 
witnesses who were called by the State were the L.H., C.E., their grandmother 
Ms. Snow, the State's expert Ms. Yeager and, on rebuttal, the victim's mother Tammy 
Erickson, none of whom would have information or incite into why law enforcement or 
the prosecutor's office failed to bring charges in this case. (See Trial Tr., Index pp.A-C; 
Trial Tr., generally.) 
In his rebuttal argument during closing, the prosecutor again referred to the late 
filing of charges stating: 
I understand we had to bring this case up almost three years after 
[the reporting to Bright Tomorrow]. In some respects the report is not 
really that late, it's just that we dropped the ball and didn't get it and I told 
you that in the beginning. Do not blame the children for that. He was 
trying to make something out of that. Well, they brought it up in 2004 and 
then it was dropped and then they bring it back up again in 2006 because 
she's gone back in for some more rehab. We dropped the ball. That's 
just the gravel and the straw. It's just not true. They brought it up. 
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(Trial Tr., p.520, L.23 - p.521, L.9.) However, this time no objection was made to this 
statement. 
Mr. Erickson contends that the district court erred in failing to sustain his 
objection when Tammy Erickson was asked whether she was aware the Sheriff's file 
was lost and that is why charges had not proceeded. Furthermore, the prosecutor's 
reference to this again in closing argument constitutes fundamental error. 
2. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Violated The District 
Court's Ruling That Bad Act Evidence Related To Mr. Erickson's Drug Use 
Or Drug Possession Had To Be Taken Up Outside Of The Jury For A 
Ruling By The Court Before It Came In 
The prosecutor also committed misconduct when he attempted to solicit 
testimony regarding Mr. Erickson's drug use or drug possession, without first obtaining 
a ruling, outside the presence of the jury, whether this information was admissible. In 
State v. Field, the Idaho Supreme Court found that it was misconduct for the prosecutor 
to question a witness about evidence that the State had promised to speak to the judge 
about, outside the presence of the jury, to determine its admissibility before offering into 
evidence. Field, 144 Idaho at 572, 165 P.3d at 286. See also State v. Agundis, 127 
Idaho 587, 596-97, 903 P.2d 752, 761-62 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding it is prosecutorial 
misconduct when the prosecutor intentionally disregards district court's ruling that 
testimony is inadmissible hearsay and attempts to elicit hearsay indirectly). 
Similarly here, the district court had specifically ruled prior to trial that "[a]ny 
evidence of Defendant's criminal acts of bad acts pertaining to illegal drugs or controlled 
substances shall not be presented to the jury by an attorney or witness without the 
necessary hearing outside the presence of the jury." (R., p.184.) Despite this ruling, 
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while cross-examining Glade Erickson, Mr. Erickson's father about Glade Erickson 
telling Tammy Erickson she could have the truck following Mr. Erickson's arrest on 
these charges, the prosecutor asked, "Do you know whether or not there were any-
were there any illegal substances found in that truck?" at which point the defense 
objected and a discussion was held outside the presence of the jury. (Trial Tr., p.269, 
Ls.4-20.) Defense counsel explained that the State was attempting to introduce 
evidence of the drug offense, which under the plea agreement in that case as well as 
the district court's prior ruling, was not to be referenced. (Trial Tr., p.369, L.23 - p.370, 
L.2.) The State explained that they were trying to use this information to demonstrate 
there might have been an ulterior motive to turning the truck over to Tammy because it 
might have been "hot with drugs" to set Tammy up. (Trial Tr., p.373, Ls.2-9.) The court 
sustained the defense objection, noting that the door had not been opened to the 
State's theory just by Glade's testimony. (Trial Tr., p.378, Ls.13-20.) 
Although the objection was sustained in this case and the testimony was not 
allowed in, it was still misconduct for the State to violate the district court's order that 
this evidence would not come in absent a hearing and determination outside the 
presence of the jury. Furthermore, most people watching this exchange would infer that 
illegal substances were likely found in the truck, even if the objection was sustained and 
the question was not answered. Presumably this is the very reason why the district 
court wanted matters related to the drug charges taken up outside the presence of the 
jury. Therefore, it was misconduct for the prosecutor to ask this question without first 
seeking permission to do so outside the presence of the jury. 
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3. The Prosecutor Committed Numerous Instances Of Misconduct During 
His Opening And Closing Arguments Resulting In Fundamental Error 
During both opening and closing statements, the prosecutor vouched for the 
believability of his witnesses and expressed his opinion that he did not believe the 
defense witnesses. During closing arguments the State also referred to information not 
in evidence, impermissibly tried to misstate or shift the burden of proof to the defense, 
and repeatedly appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury, urging the jury to 
convict Mr. Erickson based on emotional appeals and placing themselves in the alleged 
victims shoes, rather than on the evidence. Therefore, Mr. Erickson contends that this 
repeated and extensive misconduct deprived him of his right to a fair trial and his 
conviction should be reversed. 
a. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Repeatedly 
Vouched For The State's Witnesses And Against The Defense 
Witnesses 
The prosecutor committed misconduct when he repeatedly vouched for the 
State's witnesses and commented on the lack of credibility of defense witnesses. 
Although the prosecutor is given considerable latitude in his argument and can 
permissibly discuss the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising from the 
evidence, the prosecutor should not express his personal opinion or beliefs regarding 
the credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of the accused. Phi/lips, 144 Idaho 
at 86, 153 P.3d at 587; State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 715, 85 P.3d 1109, 1114 
(Ct. App. 2003). Two dangers are presented by a prosecutor's vouching for a witness. 
United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1147-1148 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 
U.S. v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1986)). Vouching can "convey the impression that 
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evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges 
against the defendant" jeopardizing the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. Furthermore, 
"the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may 
induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the 
evidence." Id. '"Vouching for a government witness in closing argument has often been 
held to be plain error, reviewable even though no objection was raised."' Frederick, 78 
F.3d 1370, 1379 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 534 
(9th Cir. 1980) 
Throughout his arguments the prosecutor repeatedly vouched for the alleged 
victims in this case, referring to his belief in their testimony and credibility. The 
prosecutor's vouching began in his opening statement after he described L.H. and C.E. 
as "damaged children" when he stated: 
So I guess when you look at your common experiences, and I 
always call on juries, kind of look at common experiences. This is 
probably one of the exceptions. You just have not seen the damaged 
goods trying to recollect and tell you what happened. They are subject to 
cross-examination. They are subject to speculation. What I'm going to 
tell you is I don't believe children under these circumstances are 
going to lie to you. I think you will find the truth.' 
(Trial Tr., p.27, L.23 - p.28, L.6; see also Trial Tr., p.25, L.23 - p.26, L.16 (emphasis 
added).) 
The prosecutor's vouching continued throughout his closing and rebuttal 
arguments. Shortly into his closing the prosecutor explained: 
You heard a lot of testimony from experts. I'm not convinced that 
experts always help us. I think sometimes you just simply believe a [L.H.], 
you believe a [C.E.J, or you just don't believe them. I believe their 
stories-I believe that their testimony is very credible. 
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(Trial Tr., p.479, Ls.2-8 (emphasis added).) The prosecutor also argued that C.E. would 
not lie to the jury stating: 
People lie for motives, for reasons. I suggest to you she's telling 
you the exact truth. Do not find her story not credible because she initially 
denied it to a strange police officer. She told it in Bright Tomorrow. She 
told the story in the preliminary hearing. She told her story here. There is 
not recanting of it. Oh, we can talk about locations, times, but she was 
pretty detailed, wasn't she? 
(Trial Tr., p.482, Ls.11-17.) Later, when referring to discrepancies in L.H.'s testimony 
the prosecutor stated: 
Is she confused? I think one time she told the officer it was her 
breast, it was underneath her pants, panties it was on the outside. She 
couldn't remember for sure. She thought they were both on the outside 
when she testified. Does that mean she's not believable? Absolutely 
not. 
(Trial Tr., p.484, Ls.7-12 (emphasis added).) 
After analogizing his expert and the defense expert to learning to farm from 
someone who has ranched with his father and grandfather vs. someone "who went to 
school, got a doctor's degree and read about it," the prosecutor then explained that the 
defense expert would set a standard that would make it impossible to prosecute anyone 
and not to let his testimony persuade them into thinking this case was weak. The 
prosecutor stated: 
Don't let them persuade you that this is a weak case because 
we're not doing what their expert thought we should do. It's a strong 
case because these witnesses, [L.H.] and [C.E.], are believable. And 
they took a lot of shots at them, a lot of cross-examination, a lot of anger, 
hard to control. It came out in chunks and bites. She should be angry. I 
understand her anger. Don't judge her because she showed emotion or 
anger. She should show that. If that helps her heal, helps her get by it, 
then she should show it. Don't use that as a reason not to believe her. 
Don't use the expert. Ah ha, it's possible, it's possible, it's possible. 
(Trial Tr., p.484, L.25- p.486, L.18 (emphasis added).) 
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Later when again referring to L.H.'s testimony, the prosecutor stated: 
At times I think. I thought she was very believable. If you cannot 
believe two of them saying their father started the same thing about the 
same age, 10 and 11, what would you do if you just had one? Sometimes 
we do. This case for you jurors is somewhat easier, not totally, but 
somewhat easier than if you had one child talking about it. 
Here there is a pattern. Here there is a history. But not as 
Dr. Rybicki said to imply a negative or false reporting, but the history when 
you look at it, the uncles that have abused children within this family. I 
think they're believable. I think they're very believable. And I think 
when you hear their testimony it just-just put yourself there a little bit. 
What was to be going through a child's mind when they're put in this 
situation? It did happen. 
(Trial Tr., p.491, L.21 - p.492, L.12 (emphasis added).) 
In addition to vouching for L.H. and C.E., the prosecutor also vouched for L.H. 
and C.E.'s' mother, Tammy Erickson, who was called as a defense witness and later 
called by the State as a rebuttal witness. The prosecutor commented that, "l thought 
she was a pretty good mom." (Trial Tr., p.492, Ls.17-18.) Later, the prosecutor stated, 
"l thought she showed remarkable control. I didn't see I thought this raging maniac who 
was willing to use the kids to get back at him. I mean, that's the defense in part. That's 
a fantasy world." (Trial Tr., p.492, L.21 - p.493, L.8.) 
In addition to vouching for his own witnesses, the prosecutor also vouched 
against or commented on the defense witnesses' lack of credibility. In rebuttal, after 
explaining to the jury that if they do not believe the girls' testimony they must acquit the 
defendant and if they do believe the girls' testimony they must convict the defendant, 
the prosecutor stated, "I think they're believable. I can look at some of the defense 
witnesses", and then goes on to compare the testimony of Janette Erickson with her son 
stating that their statements are "not even close. It's not believable." (Trial Tr., p.523, 
L.23 - p.525, L.4.) 
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The prosecutor also vouched for his own case and irnpermissibly commented on 
his belief in the defendant's guilt or innocence. In speaking about the fact that this case 
involved a divorce, the State again tried to vouch for the witnesses and place the 
prestige of its office behind its decision to prosecute stating: 
I would tell you that we do look at that as prosecutors and police 
officers when we got divorces and custody battles and we get these 
allegations. We know from our experiences, we know from Dr. Mydell 
Yeager's people, let's look at that. Don't turn a blind eye to it. That's not 
news to me. That's not new to me. We look at it very carefully. To 
suggest we just don't look at it is just not true. I've been here too long. 
I've seen too many cases. I look at it. 
But I've got two saying it, not just one. We have one family 
member, same age group complaining about the uncle, the grandfather, in 
this case the father. Who else did you have access to, they complained, 
no problems, another red flag. Huh, do I go forth on this? You know, 
serious charges. You want to make sure you look at them before you at 
least do prosecution. 
(Trial Tr., p.488, L.11 - p.489, L.2.) In addition to vouching for the witnesses, the 
prosecutor is also vouching for his decision to prosecute the case. Basically he is 
saying I looked at this case and considered everything and I would not be prosecuting 
this defendant unless I though he was guilty, which encourages the jury to convict the 
defendant based on the prosecutor's decision to prosecute, rather than the evidence at 
hand. See Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at 1147-1148. 
The prosecutor's repeated expressions regarding the believability of its witnesses 
and the lack of believability of the defense witnesses, as well as his statements 
regarding his own decision to the prosecute this case, were impermissible attempts to 
vouch for the credibility of his case and his witnesses and against the defense 
witnesses. This vouching was so prevalent throughout the prosecutor's arguments that 
it deprived Mr. Erickson of a fair trial resulting in fundamental error. 
39 
b. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Referred To 
Facts That Was Not Presented As Evidence At Trial 
As argued above is section ll(C)(1), and incorporated herein by reference, it is 
improper for the prosecutor to argue facts not in evidence during closing arguments. 
See Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. In addition to referring to why the State 
failed to pursue charges in this case for several years as argued above in section 
ll(C)(1), during closing argument, the prosecutor also presented evidence regarding 
custody laws in Idaho arguing stating: 
There is really no custody battle here. This is when we have 
custody battles. There is no custody battle here. They're trying to 
convince you and make-believe there is a custody battle. Oh, gee whiz, 
mom moved out and he's over at Audra Bell's on all the weekends. Good 
heavens. He's got a job. He's got money. Now these guys just show up, 
hey, I want my shared custody. Idaho is a 50/50 state. Unless you're 
proved to be an unfit parent, you get shared custody of your kids, joint 
custody, legal and physical. Been the law for a long time. Pretty easy. 
And mom's taking these kids and not letting you visit. That's a pretty easy 
remedy. At least he's got a job and he's got some money. Her remedy 
might be more difficult because of her financial situation circumstances, 
but he's got an easy remedy. Just walks into court unless mom can prove 
he's unfit. That's what the law says. I don't think there was a custody 
issue. They never went to court. Never any custody battle here. There is 
as of a week ago. 
(Trial Tr., p.515, L.18 - p.516, L.12.) Again no evidence regarding the custody laws of 
Idaho were submitted during trial and even if the State had tried to introduce such 
evidence, it would have likely not been allowed in because it would be irrelevant to the 
case at hand. Therefore, the State clearly argued information that was not presented to 
the jury below. 
Furthermore, by these statements the prosecutor was trying appeal to the jury's 
emotions, noting that Mr. Erickson could seek custody if he wanted it, leaving the jury 
with the impression he does not even want custody of his children or want to pursue it. 
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(See section lll(C)(3)(d) below for a discussion and case law regarding appeals to 
passions and prejudices). The affect of the argument is to focus the jury on information 
outside of the record and judge the credibility of the witnesses based on that 
information, rather than to focus the jury on the evidence presented at trial. Therefore, 
Mr. Erickson contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he referred to 
facts not in evidence during his closing arguments. 
c. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He lmpermissibly 
Misstated The Burden Of Proof, Implying The Jury Was To 
Determine What Burden Of Proof Was Appropriate 
It is also prosecutoria! misconduct for a prosecutor to misstate the law or the 
reasonable doubt standard in closing arguments. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 
156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Jdaho 758, 769, 864 P.2d 
596, 607 (1993). See also State v. Miles, 139 Wash.App. 879, 162 P.3d 1169 
(Wash.App.Div.2. 2007) ("Although prosecutors have "wide latitude" to make inferences 
about witness credibility, it is flagrant misconduct to shift the burden of proof to the 
defendant.") It is the State's burden to prove each element of its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt and the defendant has no duty to present any evidence. See In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
At the beginning of his closing argument, while thanking the jury for its service, 
the prosecutor explained how important it is that "we have people willing to sacrifice 
their time" to serve on the jury and stated: 
We need the moms and dads, the grandpas, the sons and 
daughters who live on Main Street to take a look at what we do as 
lawyers, what we do as prosecutors, what we do as judges and tell us, 
communicate with us, on what these cases are and what it takes for 
the State to make this case. 
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(Trial Tr., p.475, Ls.15-10 (emphasis added).) Later, at the end of his rebuttal, the 
prosecutor again returned to this theme of the jury setting the standard for determining 
the burden of proof, although this time more egregiously shifting or misstating the 
burden of proof when stating: 
I just think the bottom line is this, it's our communities and our families, our 
children. We have the legal, moral, ethic obligation to protect them. You 
set a standard for myself as prosecutor. You set the standard for law 
enforcement. We look at these cases very carefully. What is the 
standard in Bear Lake County by a jury on what they're going to 
accept as proof of child molestation? That's all it's about. 
(Trial Tr., p.526, Ls.9-13 (emphasis added).) This statement is calling on the jury to 
look not at the law regarding burden of proof, but their own emotional responses, to 
determine for themselves based on their visceral reaction whether the defendant is 
guilty, shifting or misstating the burden of proof. 
By shifting or misstating the burden of proof required to convict Mr. Erickson, the 
prosecutor committed misconduct by encouraging the jury to convict Mr. Erickson based 
on what they believed was adequate proof, rather than proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
d. The Prosecutor lmpermissibly Appealed To The Jury's Emotions 
During The Closing Arguments 
Throughout his closing arguments, the prosecutor also tried to appeal to the 
emotions, passions, or prejudices of the jury by the use of inflammatory tactics designed 
to place the jury in the shoes of the "victim" and by arguing the jury should convict 
Mr. Erickson to serve justice. See Phillips, 144 Idaho at 587-588. It is improper for a 
prosecutor to urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant by appealing "to the passions, 
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fears and vulnerabilities of the jury." Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at 1149. This includes 
urging a conviction to protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future 
lawbreaking. Id. The problem with appeals to emotion is that it encourages the jury to 
convict the defendant based on reasons entirely separate from his own guilt or 
innocence. Id. See also Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87, 156 P.3d at 588 ("Nothing should 
tempt [the prosecutor] to appeal to prejudices, to pervert the testimony, or make 
statements to the jury, which whether true or not, have not been proved."). 
The prosecutor is not permitted ask the jury to place themselves or their family 
members in the place of the victim. State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 554, 559, 816 P.2d 
1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991). However, throughout his closing arguments, the prosecutor 
encouraged the jury to place themselves in shoes of the alleged victims in this case. 
When talking about C.E. initially denying that her father had ever touched her 
inappropriately, the State asked the jury to place themselves in C.E.'s shoes stating: 
I think she was about 13 or 14 when she was confronted with this. 
You just-what would you say? You use your common sense. Put 
yourself in that position. What would you say? Even if you had been 
abused and somebody out of the clear blue just knocks on the door and 
asks about your father, you would probably deny it. 
You would then go to a person you trust. Mom's not there, 
grandma is. You might start your disclosure then. I don't find that unusual 
at all. I don't find that justification for not believing what C.E. told us. 
Does that now mean-I mean, what is her motive for getting up and lying 
under oath about what her father did to her? Why in the world would C.E. 
lie in that situation? Ask yourself that. Why would that girl lie in that 
situation? Because if she's telling the truth, he's guilty. The only way he's 
not guilty is you have to accept she decided to get up and lie to us all. 
(Trial Tr., p.481, l.17 - p.482, L.10 (emphasis added).) Shortly after this the prosecutor 
recalled how C.E. cried while explaining where Mr. Erickson had alleged touched her 
and tried to put the jury in shoes of the alleged victims' family stating, "Would any of you 
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not believe this is lewd and lascivious, this is not sexual battery of a minor? Would you 
allow your daughters and your granddaughters? None of us would. We would be irate?" 
(Trial Tr., p.483, Ls.3-7.) 
Later in his closing, the prosecutor stated: 
Think about your own experiences. Think about your childhoods. 
Think about your roles as parents, grandparents. You know, how would 
you feel? How would you feel knowing that your testimony might 
put your father through that, somebody you love. I find it pretty 
common. I don't find that extraordinary. I don't find that for a reason not 
to believe her. It gives her credibility. It's emotional. It's real. It adds to 
that credibility. 
What is that child going to do now? You know, I got away from it 
and now I'm kind of back in it again a few months later, six or seven 
months later. You are probably going to think about telling 
somebody. You might go in with your friend to talk to the resource 
officer ... and my stepdad is touching me inappropriately and I'm 
uncomfortable with the way he touches me. You might ring the bell. 
(Trial Tr., p.489, Ls.15-23, p.490, Ls.2-10 (emphasis added).) Shortly after this 
statement, the prosecutor again stated, "just put yourself there a little bit. What was to 
be going through a child's mind when they're put in this situation? It did happen". (Trial 
Tr., p.492, Ls.9-12.) 
By asking the jury to place themselves in the shoes of the alleged victims several 
times throughout closing arguments, the prosecutor was appealing to the passions and 
prejudices of the jury. Such an appeal poses as significant risk that the jury convicted 
Mr. Erickson not based on the evidence, but their emotions. 
Finally, the prosecutor appealed to the emotions of the jury when he urged them 
to convict Mr. Erickson to protect the community and to serve justice, commenting that 
there is a downside to acquitting Mr. Erickson. When closing his rebuttal arguments the 
prosecutor stated: 
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I just think the bottom line is this, it's our communities and our 
families, our children. We have the legal, moral, ethic obligation to 
protect them. You set the standard for myself as prosecutor. You set 
the standard for law enforcement. We look at these cases very carefully. 
What is the standard in Bear Lake County by a jury on what they're going 
to accept as proof of child molestation? That's all it's about. 
And if your saying, Mr. [prosecutor], L.H., C.E., Officer 
Martinez, it's just not there, I've got to have more than this, we 
understand that, but there is also a downside to it. I can't bring the 
perfect case. There will always be the possibility there. I bring you two 
people molested by their father at pretty much the same age. One gives 
credibility to the other. One collaborates the other. The pattern is similar. 
Circumstances are similar. You as a juror are saying I don't believe either 
one of them. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I tell you this is proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Justice demands that this father, this defendant, be convicted. 
What he breached, the trust he breached, cannot happen without 
consequences. The trust he breached as a parent to his daughters 
cannot happen without consequences. You must convict him to serve 
justice. A conviction of guilty is justice in this case. 
(Trial Tr., p.526, L.25 - p.527, L.6 (emphasis added).) In addition to the vouching 
described in section ll(C){3)(a) and the attempts to shift the burden of proof described 
above in section ll(C)(3)( c), this passage calls on the jury to convict Mr. Erickson to 
protect community values and to serve justice. Although normally justice would be what 
the law requires the jury to find, by previously mischaracterizing the jury's role into 
determining what standard of proof the prosecutor needed to set forth and implying that 
there are consequences to an acquittal, this statement furthered the misconduct that 
had already occurred in the prosecutor's previous statements and encouraged the jury 
to convict Mr. Erickson based on a sense of community justice rather than the evidence 
that was before the jury. 
Therefore, Mr. Erickson contends the State impermissibly appealed to the 
passion and prejudices of the jury by encouraging them to place themselves in the 
shoes of the alleged victims and their families and by asking them to convict 
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Mr. Erickson to protect community values and to serve justice, the prosecutor 
committed misconduct amounting to fundamental error. 
e. The Prosecutor's Repeated Misconduct So Infected The Trial In 
Mr. Erickson's Case, That Even If Each Episode Of Misconduct By 
Itself Did Not Rise To Fundamental Error, When Viewed 
Cumulatively, The Misconduct Constituted Fundamental Error 
Even if this Court finds that each episode of prosecutorial misconduct did not 
amount to fundamental error by itself, the prosecutor's conduct when viewed 
cumulatively, did amount to fundamental error, depriving Mr. Erickson of his right to a 
fair trial. In State v. Gross, the Idaho Court of Appeals reviewed the cumulative affect of 
the State's improper comments when determining whether fundamental error occurred. 
146 Idaho 15, 21, 189 P.3d 477, 483 (2008). In doing so the Court noted that under the 
cumulative error doctrine, the accumulation of irregularities which by themselves may 
be harmless, when aggregated demonstrate the absence of a fair trial, violating the 
defendant's right to due process. Id. (citing State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 
P.2d 174, 183 (1998). Likewise, here, even if each instance of unobjected to 
prosecutorial misconduct did not deprive Mr. Erickson of his right to a fair trial, the 
cumulative affect of the prosecutor's misconduct in this case did deprive Mr. Erickson of 
his right to a fair trial, thereby establishing fundamental error. 
D. The Episodes Of Prosecutorial Misconduct In This Case Do Not Amount To 
Harmless Error, Either Individually Or Cumulatively 
The numerous improper statements by the prosecutor each individually, or 
alternatively, viewed as whole, cannot be harmless. See State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 
21, 189 P.3d 477, 483 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Harrison, 136 Idaho 504, 37 P.3d 1 
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(Ct. App. 2001) (holding that under the doctrine of cumulative error, the "accumulation 
of irregularities, each of which in itself might be harmless, may in the aggregate show 
the absence of a fair trial.") "Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but 
when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any 
accused is treated unfairly." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In State v. 
Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346, 509 P.2d 331 (1973), the Idaho Supreme Court, when 
reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, quoted the language of the United States 
Supreme Court which found: 
'The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party 
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a 
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and 
very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that 
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with 
earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike 
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his 
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a 
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring 
about a just one.' 
Id. at 353-354, 509 P.2d at 338, 339 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 
(1935) (emphasis added)). 
Here it simply cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the misconduct of 
the prosecutor in this case did not contribute to Mr. Erickson's conviction. Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507, 616 P.2d 1034, 
1043 (1980). Much of this case hinged on whether the jurors believed the testimony of 
the alleged victims, L.H. and C.E .. 
At trial, evidence was presented that L.H. and C.E. had given inconsistent 
statements and had not been completely truthful with Detective Vollmer during the initial 
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investigation into these charges. C.E. admitted that when she was initially questioned, 
she denied that her father had touched her inappropriately and that she had lied to the 
officer when questioned. (Trial Tr., p.95, Ls.14-22.) When asked if Mr. Erickson was 
still living with her at Ms. Snow's in 2004, C.E. testified that he had moved out. (Trial 
Tr., p.91, Ls.8-10.) However, when she was questioned on cross-examination about 
reporting to Tony Vollmer that he was still living with them in April 2004, she agreed that 
he was living with her in 2004, although she did not remember this and this could have 
been a lie. (Trial Tr., p.91, L.8 - p.92, L.7, p.100, Ls.16-21.) Furthermore, when she 
testified at the preliminary hearing, she testified that the alleged incident with 
Mr. Erickson occurred in July 2004, but at trial she testified that the event actually 
occurred around the end of March 2004. (Trial Tr., p.83, L.4 - p.84, L. 12, p.88, 
L.4 - p.89, L.23.) 
L.H. could not remember much of what allegedly happened, including how old 
she was at the time of the alleged incident after school. (Trial Tr., p.112, L.25 - p.113, 
L.1.) L.H. also admitted that she had told officers in Pocatello that Mr. Erickson had 
been arrested and she didn't have a problem anymore, stating she lied to the officers 
because she wanted it all to go away. (Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.15-22.) The defense also 
admitted Defense Exhibit 1, which was a letter L.H. wrote to her father stating that she 
wished she had never made these statements and that it was just something that had 
come out of her mouth. (Trial Tr., p.127, L.10 - p. 130, L.6.) Defense counsel also 
asked L.H. if she remembered testifying differently at the preliminary hearing, stating 
that the first alleged incident after school happened in 2001, the second alleged incident 
in the trailer happened in 2002, and the third alleged incident happened in 2003 in 
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Pocatello. (Trial Tr., p.131, L.25 - p.133, L.20.) L.H. stated, "[w]hether the time line is 
right or not, I don't know." (Trial Tr., p.133, Ls.22-23.) 
Detective Vollmer testified that L.H. had stated that no touching ever occurred in 
Pocatello and that Mr. Erickson had not touched her any other times. (Trial Tr., p.393, 
Ls.1-19.) L.H. also told detective Vollmer that Mr. Erickson was in jail, although he was 
not. (Trial Tr., p.391, Ls.9-24.) L.H. told the detective that Mr. Erickson had moved out 
of Ms. Snow's home and that he had moved his stuff back to Bear Lake. (Trial 
Tr., p.392, Ls.10-16.) Detective Vollmer also testified that when she interviewed C.E., 
C.E. denied that Mr. Erickson had every touched her inappropriately. (Trial Tr., p.394, 
L.18 - p.396, L.9.) C.E. also told Detective Vollmer that Mr. Erickson was currently 
living with them and that she had seen him the night prior to the interview. (Trial 
Tr., p.394, Ls.6-17.) 
Defense witnesses also testified that L.H. had made statements regarding the 
case indicating that the allegations were false. Janette Erickson, Mr. Erickson's sister-
in-law testified that after she told L.H. she should go see her Grandma Rose, 
Mr. Erickson's Grandmother, because she had been diagnosed with a brain tumor, L.H. 
explained that she could not go over there "because of all the stuff that was going on" 
later referring to it as "all the bullshit that's going on" and that L.H. stated that "she was 
just sick of it and it was just a bunch of lies." (Trial Tr., p.331, l.22 - p.332, l.8, p.333, 
L.18 - p.334, L.14.) Larry Erickson, Janette Erickson's son and Mr. Erickson's nephew, 
testified that he had overheard this conversation and that L.H. said she could not go 
visit grandma Rose and then stated, "just tell Scott not to worry about anything because 
nothing happened." (Trial Tr., p.339, L.21 - p.341, L.25.) He testified that he did not 
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recall anything else L.H. had said during the conversation. (Trial Tr., p.342, Ls.1-6.) 
Melissa Lish, Mr. Erickson's niece, testified that L.H. had told her that she had made 
these allegations because one of her friends had and that Mr. Erickson did not do 
anything. (Trial Tr., p.343, Ls.4-20, p.345, Ls.12-23.) 
Additionally, the defense presented witnesses who explained that the relationship 
between Mr. Erickson, his ex-wife and the children had been tumultuous at times. 
Marianne Hess, the step-mother of Mr. Erickson's nieces, testified that on one occasion 
she had gone to Tammy's house to pick up her step-daughter and that Tammy and the 
children were extremely upset with Mr. Erickson regarding the dispute over the vehicles 
and that Tammy told Ms. Hess that "she would do anything to get [Mr. Erickson] locked 
up or thrown in prison." (Trial Tr., p.318, L.9 - p.319, L.22, p.321, L. 13 - p.322, L.3.) 
Likewise, Tammy Erickson admitted that when her and Mr. Erickson separated 
that she was angry with Mr. Erickson, that she accused him of stalking her and putting a 
bug in her car. (Trial Tr., p.309, Ls.12-20.) She also admitted that the children believed 
that Mr. Erickson was the one who had turned her into police for her drug problem, 
which resulted in her going on retained jurisdiction in 2004. (Trial Tr., p.306, 
L.13-p.307, L.6, p.309, L.24- p.310, L.3.) 
C.E. also admitted that she was mad at her father prior to reporting these 
allegations. (Trial Tr. p.92, Ls.14-15, p.98, Ls.9-21.) When her mother separated from 
Mr. Erickson, her mother was very angry at him and C.E.'s family had told her that 
Mr. Erickson was stalking her father. (Trial Tr., p.92, L.16 - p.93, L.10.) In the 
interview with Bright Tomorrrows, C.E. told the interviewer that she thought Mr. Erickson 
had put a bug in her mother's car. (Trial Tr., p.93, Ls.3-6.) L.H. also admitted that when 
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asked if Mr. Erickson was her step-father, she had responded "unfortunately," although 
she stated she was not bringing this up because of anger toward Mr. Erickson. (Trial 
Tr., p.138, L.25 - p.139, L.2.) 
Given the disputed nature of the allegations and the contradicting testimony and 
statements, it is highly likely that the prosecutor's misconduct contributed to 
Mr. Erickson's conviction. Therefore, the error in this case is not harmless. 
Ill. 
Mr. Erickson's Right To Due Process And Right To Be Free From Self Incrimination 
Were Violated When The State Elicited Testimony From Detective Vollmer That 
Mr. Erickson Refused To Corne In For An Interview 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Erickson asserts that his rights to due process and to be free from self 
incrimination, protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, were violated when the 
prosecutor used his pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to infer his guilty. During the cross-
examination of Detective Vollmer, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the detective 
indicating that Mr. Erickson failed to meet with her and refused to be interviewed by her 
regarding the accusations in this case. 
B. Mr. Erickson's Due Process Rights Were Violated When The State Elicited 
Testimony From Detective Vollmer That Mr. Erickson Refused To Be Interviewed 
Regarding The Accusations 
Mr. Erickson asserts that his due process rights, protected by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as Article I,§ 13 of 
the Idaho Constitution, were violated when the prosecutor elicited testimony from 
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Detective Vollmer that Mr. Erickson failed to meet with her and refused to be 
interviewed regarding the accusations in this case. Furthermore, the solicitation of 
these comments on Mr. Erickson's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence by the prosecutor 
constituted fundamental error and the error was not harmless. 
Both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as Incorporated by 
the Fourteenth Amendments to the United State's Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the 
Idaho Constitution provide that "[n]o person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. Amend V; Idaho Const. art. I, § 13. 
Additionally, Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution states that no person shall be 
compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself. Idaho Const. art. 
I § 13. The Idaho courts have repeatedly held that using pre-Miranda or post-Miranda 
silence to infer the guilt of the defendant is a violation of the defendant's rights to silence 
and due process. See State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 820, 965 P.2d 174, 180 (1998); 
State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 677, 67 P.3d 1283, 1289 (Ct. App. 2003). 
In State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 551 P.2d 1344 (1976), the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that, "If a prosecutor is allowed to introduce evidence of silence, for any purpose 
then the right to remain silent guaranteed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 
S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) becomes so diluted as to be rendered worthless." 
Id. at 714-715, 551 P.2d at 1350-1351. The Court went on to find, "[i]t is clearly 
erroneous to allow evidence of post-arrest silence at trial for the purpose of raising an 
inference of guilt." Id. at 715, 551 P.2d at 1351 (citation omitted). Similarly, in Doyle v. 
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held "that the use for 
impeachment purposes of petitioner's silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving 
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Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." In 
Doyle, the actions of the prosecutor in cross-examining the defendants as to the reason 
they had not given their version of events at the time of their arrests were the actions 
that violated the defendants' due process rights. Id. at 613-614, n.5. 
In State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 820, 965 P.2d 174, 180 (1998), the Idaho 
Supreme Court further extended its holding in White to pre-Miranda silence used for the 
purposes of inferring guilt holding: 
We believe the better rule is that which holds that the defendants' Fifth 
Amendment right not to have their silence used against them in a court 
proceeding is applicable pre-arrest and pre-Miranda warnings. The 
constitutional right is always present. 'While the presence of Miranda 
warnings might provide an additional reason for disallowing use of the 
defendant's silence, they are not a necessary condition to such a 
prohibition.' 
Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (th Cir. 1987)). 
Furthermore, in State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 67 P.3d 1283 (Ct. App. 
2003), the Idaho Court of Appeals held: 
The prohibitions against prosecutorial use of pre-Miranda silence and of 
post-Miranda silence spring from the same constitutional doctrine. 
Therefore, we conclude that the State's presentation of evidence of 
Kerchusky's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence constituted fundamental error 
subject to appellate review. 
Id. at 678, 67 P.3d at 1290. 
Here, by eliciting testimony from Detective Vollmer during cross-examination 
regarding Mr. Erickson's exercise of his right to silence by refusing to be interviewed or 
comment on the allegations in this case, the prosecutor was clearly using this 
information to infer Mr. Erickson's guilt based on these actions. After defense counsel 
examined Detective Vollmer regarding her investigation into the accusations in this case 
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and her interviews with L.H., C.E., and their grandmother Ms. Snow, the State began its 
cross-examination of Detective Vollmer with the following exchange: 
[Prosecutor]: Did you set up-did you try and interview Scott Erickson 
concerning some of the information you had from L.H.? 
[Vollmer]: Yes, I did. 
[Prosecutor]: And how did you go about trying to interview him? 
[Vollmer]: I spoke with him on the phone and attempted to set up a time 
for him to come in for an interview. 
[Prosecutor]: And did he come in? 
[Vollmer]: No, sir. He refused to come in. 
[Prosecutor]: Did you try and set it up a second time? 
[Vollmer]: 1-1 believe I had two phone conversations. He didn't make it 
on one and then he said he wouldn't be coming in on the second, but I 
can't recall without looking at my notes. 
[Prosecutor]: Typically in investigations do you try and get the-at least 
the person that's the subject of the investigation, you try to get their 
statement and their position on it? 
[Vollmer]: Yes, sir. Try to get both sides of the-
[Prosecutor]: That didn't happen in this case because he never came in for 
an interview? 
[Vollmer]: He never came in for an interview, correct. 
(Trial Tr., p.399, L.15 - p.400, L.13.) 
The defense's direct examination of Detective Vollmer had dealt with her 
investigation into the claims made by the alleged victims in this case. (Trial Tr., p.388, 
L.15- p.399, L.13.) The only reference to conversations Detective Vollmer might have 
had with Mr. Erickson came up in the context of how Detective Vollmer found out that 
Mr. Erickson was not in jail, contrary to what L.H. had told her. (Trial Tr., p.391, L.9 -
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p.392, L.4.) There was never any allegation that detective Vollmer failed to adequately 
investigate the allegations or that Mr. Erickson had said something to her regarding the 
allegations. (Trial Tr., p.388, L.15 - p.399, L.13.) 
In State v. Moore, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the actions of the 
prosecutor who elicited testimony from a State's witness that the defendant refused to 
attend pre-arrest, pre-Miranda police interviews. Moore, 131 Idaho at 820-21, 965 P.2d 
at 180-81. Although the Court held that the use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to 
infer guilt is unconstitutional, it found that the evidence was probative on the issue of 
flight and, therefore, the testimony was admissible as to the that issue. Id. at 821, 965 
P .2d at 181. Here, there was no valid reason for the prosecutor to illicit this information 
other to infer Mr. Erickson's guilt and the testimony violated Mr. Erickson's rights to 
silence and due process. 
C. The Violation Of Mr. Erickson's Rights To Due Process And Silence Constituted 
Fundamental Error And It Was Not Necessary For Mr. Erickson To Obiect To 
The Prosecutor's Actions At Trial In Order To Preserve The Issue For Appeal 
No objections pursuant to the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments were made 
against the prosecution's use of the above questions and statements at trial. (Trial 
Tr., p.399, L.15 - p.400, L.13.) However, Idaho Courts have previously held that the 
use of pre- or post- Miranda silence to imply guilty is a fundamental error that is 
reviewable absent an objection. State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709, 992 P.2d 158 (1999); 
State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 678, 67 P.3d 1283, 1290 (Ct. App. 2003). 
As described above in sections II (C), and incorporated herein by reference, an 
appellate court will generally only address issues on appeal which were preserved 
through an objection at the trial court level, an appellate court may consider 
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fundamental error in a criminal case, even though no objection was made below. See 
State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 645, 945 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Ct. App. 1997). The 
Idaho Court of Appeals has previously held that a claim that the State improperly used a 
defendant's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence constitutes fundamental error. In State v. 
Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 67 P.3d 1283 (Ct. App. 2003), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
held: 
The prohibitions against prosecutorial use of pre-Miranda silence and of 
post-Miranda silence spring from the same constitutional doctrine. 
Therefore, we conclude that the State's presentation of evidence of 
Kerchusky's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence constituted fundamental error 
subject to appellate review. 
Id. at 678, 67 P.3d at 1290. 
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the issues in State v. Strouse, 133 
Idaho 709, 992 P.2d 158 (1999), under a fundamental error analysis. In Strouse, the 
Court found the evidence regarding the defendant's post-Miranda silence was 
inadmissible and, after finding the error was not harmless, vacated the conviction and 
remanded the case for new trial. Id. at 714. 992 P.2d at 163. 
More recently, in State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 114 P.3d 133 (Ct. App. 2005), 
the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a due process violation following a prosecutor's 
use of a defendant's silence against him amounts to fundamental error. Id. 141 Idaho at 
577, 114 P.3d at 135. Therefore, Mr. Erickson asserts that the prosecutor's use of his 
silence in this case to infer his guilt constituted fundamental error and is reviewable 
absent an objection below. 
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D. The Prosecutor's Use Of Mr. Erickson's Refusal To Be Interviewed Regarding 
The Accusations To Infer His Guilt Was Not Harmless Error 
In Strouse, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that, "[w]hen inadmissible 
evidence has been introduced, the question is whether this Court is 'convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the same result would have been reached had the evidence 
been properly excluded?"' Strouse, 133 Idaho at 714, 992 P.2d at 163 (citation 
omitted). Similarly, in Poland, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated, "[f]or a 
fundamental error to be held harmless, the court must declare a belief, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence 
complained of contributed to the conviction." Poland, 116 Idaho at 37, 773 P.2d at 654 
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). 
Here, as argued above in Section ll(D) and incorporated by reference, the case 
hinged entirely on the credibility of L.H. and C.E. Evidence was presented regarding 
how there stories had changed over time and the family turmoil that has existed 
between Mr. Erickson and his wife/ex-wife Tammy. Furthermore, although charged 
with three counts of lewd and lascivious conduct, Mr. Erickson was only found guilty of 
two counts of sexual abuse of a child and was acquitted entirely of the third. 




The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Admitted Evidence Of Alleged 
Irrelevant Conduct Or Prior Bad Acts Of The Defendant 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Erickson asserts the district court erred in admitting allegations of prior 
conduct or bad acts that he allegedly committed when it allowed in testimony that he 
had not or was not paying child support. Mr. Erickson contends that the State failed to 
give notice under 404(b) that it was going to use this evidence, and that even with 
adequate notice this evidence was not admissible under 404(b). 
B. Standard Of Review 
When reviewing the admissibility of 404(b) evidence the appellate court employs 
a two-part analysis. State v. Scovell, 136 Idaho 587, 38 P.3d 625 (Ct. App. 2001). The 
appellate court reviews the relevancy of the evidence de novo. Id. The determination 
of whether the evidence's probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair 
prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. This requires the appellate court to 
answer three questions: (1) whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as 
calling for an exercise of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted consistently with 
governing legal standards so as to stay within the outer boundaries of its discretion; and 
(3) whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. 
Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 592, 977 P.2d 203, 206(1999). 
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C. The District Court Erred Admitting Testimony The Mr. Erickson Had Not Paid Any 
Child Support For His Children Because It Was Impermissible Character 
Evidence Under 404(b) And The State Failed To Give Notice Of Its Intent To Use 
This Information 
It is part of the American legal system that an accused may only be convicted 
based upon proof that he committed the crime with which he is charged and not based 
upon poor character. State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241,244, 880 P.2d 771, 774 (Ct. App. 
1994). Evidence of misconduct not charged in an underlying offense may have an 
unjust influence on the jurors and may lead them to determine guilt based upon either: 
(1) a presumption that if the defendant did it before, he must have done it this time; or 
(2) an opinion that it does not really matter whether the defendant committed the 
charged crime because he deserves to be punished anyhow for other bad acts. Id. at 
244-45, 880 P.2d at 774-75. Therefore, I.R.E. 404 precludes the use of character 
evidence or other misconduct evidence to imply that the defendant must have acted 
consistently with those past acts or traits. Id. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident, provided that the prosecution in a 
criminal case shall file and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, or 
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown .... 
To admit evidence of prior misconduct, two things must be shown. State v. 
Medina, 128 Idaho 19, 24, 909 P.2d 637, 642 (Ct. App. 1996). "First, the evidence must 
be relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged ... [sJecond, 
the court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially 
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outweighed by the danger of causing unfair prejudice to the defendant." Id. The Idaho 
Court of Appeals has held: 
This exclusion is based upon the theory that evidence of other crimes 
'induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to have committed 
the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character. It, therefore, 
takes the jury away from their primary consideration of [the] guilt or 
innocence of the particular crime on trial.' 
State v. Winkler, 112 Idaho 917, 919, 736 P.2d 1371, 1372 (Ct. App. 1987) (citing 
State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510, 854, P.2d 1231, 1235 (1978)). Ultimately, I.R.E. 
404(b) is a rule of exclusion rather than inclusion. State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 721-
722, 23 P.3d 786, 795-796 (Ct. App. 2001); see generally State v. Grist, 2009 Opinion 
No. 14 (January 29, 2009). 
Here, while Tammy Erickson was testifying regarding the incident where she, 
and her children came to Mr. Erickson's and took the truck, the State asked Tammy 
Erickson if she was getting child support for the children. (Trial Tr., p.437, L.10 - p.439, 
L.9-25.) Defense counsel immediately objected stating this was irrelevant and improper 
character evidence. (Trial Tr., p.439, Ls.9-25.) After the State argued that it was simply 
trying to show her desperate need for a vehicle, the district court overruled the 
objection, and Tammy Erickson was allowed to testify that she was not receiving any 
child support. (Trial Tr., p.439, Ls.19-25.) By asking Tammy Erickson whether she was 
receiving child support, the State solicited testimony by inference that Mr. Erickson was 
not providing child support for his children. Mr. Erickson contends this testimony was 
improper character evidence under I.R.E. 404 and should not have been allowed in. 
Unfortunately, the district court did not appear to recognize that this was 
character evidence under 404(b), despite the defense's objection that this was improper 
character evidence. The failure to pay child support is a bad act by the defendant. 
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Although it was not clear whether he was obligated legally to pay child support, possibly 
making his failure a crime, the mere act of not paying child support is a bad act, 
indicating that Mr. Erickson is not supporting his children. (See I.C. § 18-401; State v. 
Shaw, 96 Idaho 897, 539 P.2d 250 (1975) (findng the court had jurisdiction over out of 
state defendant's criminal charges for failure to pay child support). 
This evidence should not have been admitted in this case because it did not go 
to an issue material to the crime charged. Mr. Erickson was charged with three counts 
of lewd conduct with a minor; therefore, whether Mr. Erickson was paying child support 
was completely irrelevant to the crimes charged in this case. Furthermore, the 
prejudicial effect of such evidence substantially outweighed the probative value. The 
jury was most apt to take away from this testimony that Mr. Erickson has not paid child 
support for his children, indicating he is a bad father. Such an inference greatly 
outweighs any probative calue. 
Finally, even if this was proper 404(b) evidence, no notice was ever provided by 
the State that it was going to use such evidence at trial. In State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 
225, 178 P.3d 28 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court found that the failure of the State to 
provide 404(b) notice prior to soliciting bad act testimony constituted reversible error. 
145 Idaho at 227, 178 P.3d at 30. In Sheldon, the State introduced evidence of 
admissions by the defendant related to his substance abuse. Id. at 229, 178 P.3d at 32. 
In allowing the testimony in, the district court failed to recognize that this was improper 
character evidence under 404(b) and did not engage in the 404(b) analysis. Id. 
Furthermore, the State failed to provide any notice of its intent to use this evidence. Id. 
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Similarly here, the State never provided notice that it would be using evidence 
related to Mr. Erickson's failure to pay child support at trial. Prior to trial the State filed a 
Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence of other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts under 404(b) 
stating that: 
The general nature of the evidence will be consistent with the 
testimony given by each of the alleged victims at the preliminary hearing in 
this matter wherein they alleged that there were other crimes, wrong, or 
acts committed against them by the Defendant of a lewd and lascivious 
nature which involved touching of the alleged victims in the vaginal or 
breast area. 
Particularly, the alleged victim [L.H.] will testify that the Defendant 
touched her when she was residing in Pocatello, Idaho, when he was in 
bed with her. This incident was witnessed partially by Susan Snow the 
maternal grandparent of the alleged victim, [L.H.] Susan Snow will testify 
discovering Defendant in bed with [L.H.] 
(R., p.27.) This notice does not cite or make any reference to the defendant's failure to 
pay child support. 
Therefore, the district court erred in allowing Tammy Erickson to testify that she 
had not received any child support. 
V. 
The Repeated Misconduct And Errors In This Case Resulted In Cumulative Error 
Depriving Mr. Erickson Of A Fair Trial 
Under the cumulative error doctrine, the reversal of a conviction is required when 
there is '"an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but 
when aggregated ... show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention of the defendant's 
constitutional right to due process."' State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 (2007) 
(quoting State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998)). Here, even if 
each of the errors by themselves were harmless, the accumulation of these errors 
demonstrates that Mr. Erickson was denied his right to a fair trial under the United 
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States and Idaho Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Idaho Const., art. 
I§ 13. 
The State's repeated misconduct throughout Mr. Erickson's trial deprived him of 
a fair trial. The misconduct began with the prosecutor's use of his peremptory 
challenges to only strike men from the jury in violation of Batson. The misconduct 
continued throughout the trial from the opening statements to the closing arguments. 
The prosecutor impermissibly vouched for witnesses, commented on facts not in 
evidence, improperly argued evidence not admitted at trial, repeatedly appealed to the 
passions and prejudices of the jury, and solicited testimony that Mr. Erickson refused to 
be interviewed regarding the allegations in violation of Mr. Erickson's rights to be free 
from incrimination and due process. Given this flagrant misconduct, it can hardly be 
said that Mr. Erickson's conviction was obtained through a fair and just trial. 
Additionally, the district court allowed in testimony that Mr. Erickson had not paid any 
child support for his children, which was improper character evidence. Therefore, in 
light of these errors, Mr. Erickson was deprived of a fair trial and his conviction should 
be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Erickson respectfully requests that his conviction be vacated and his case 
remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this 1ih day of March, 2009. 
EATHER M. CARLSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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1 MR. HELM: I would, your Honor, 
2 Congratulations. You've been called upon to do one 
3 of the most important jobs in your civic duty or your 
4 civic lives, There will be no greater job than to be 
5 called to sit in judgement of facts when somebody is 
6 accused of a crime. It's our connection to Main 
7 Street. We ask ordinary people to do extraordinary 
8 things. On behalf of my office we certainly appreciate 
9 the time you take, the dedication you have to be here 
10 and the fact that you will now sit as jurors. 
11 This is, as you kind of get a feel and we talk 
12 aboutit from time to time, a delicate case, It's a 
13 breach of trust. It's a breach of the most basic trust 
14 that we have as human beings and as families. Not the 
15 breach of trust of a stranger, not the breach of trust 
16 of a distant relative, not a classmate. We're talking 
17 about the breach of trust ofa father. The trust the 
18 child has in its mother, its father. The duty morally 
19 and ethically to protect the child has been breached. 
20 It's the breaching of that trust not because you 
21 let them in harm's way, but it even goes more basic. 
22 You are the perpetrator of that breach. You looked 
23 upon young daughters as sexual objects. So from the 
24 · beginning, when we have cases that involve family, that 
25 involve parents, breaching that basic trust that 
25 
· 1 children have, you will always see, in my opinion, 
2 damaged goods. What you see are not professional 
. 3 answers. What you see are not people such as me or my 
4 police officers that deal in the court oflaw. You do 
5 not see adults who are mature socially. What you will 
6 see will be damaged children, Sometimes I never know 
7 how to predict it. It's always hard to understand and 
8 predict their testimony, Sometimes they won't have 
9 good eye contact. They won'tlook you in the eye. · 
· 10 . s.ometimes you'll see their head fall; Sometimes, Why 
11 didn't you report it? Because when the breach of a 
12 . yoimg child is by the father, the mother, somebody in a 
13., trusted position, they're conflicted. It's somebody 
14 they love, It's somebody they bonded with as a parent. 
15 Sometimes a reporting doesn't take place when the 
16 u,.cidenttook place, 
17 · · We will call an expert, The expert is a licensed 
· 18 counselor in Idaho, practices mainly in Boise, but the 
1 ~ majority of her practice is counseling people who have 
.20. · been sexually abused, especially adolescents and 
. .i1 · children. She'll talk about some of these things that 
· . 22 you will see from the children thattestify here. You 
23 are seeing these children years after the incident. 
· 24 · Some of that because they didn't report it timely, some 
·· l25 · · of that burden falls upon us. When it was discovered 
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1 in the Pocatello school system by a resource officer 
2 and a counselor, it was reported to their officers that 
3 specialize in that. They realize initially that this 
4 really took place in Bear Lake. They contacted our law 
5 enforcement sheriff's office and the deputy that was 
6 assigned to that simply dropped it, stood there for 
7 more than three years. Whep. they inquired what had 
8 become of it, it got turned over to Deputy Martinez. 
9 Martinez contacted my office and three years later we 
10 start trying to locate these victims. Try to 
· 11 · re-interview them, trying to talk to them, Trying to 
12 .go back. That was our mistake. Believe me, I have 
13 apologized to them. I've apologized to the parents and 
14 loved ones. It should not have happened, but it did 
15 happen. 
16 When you talk about a breach of trust, keep in mind 
17 some of the things you're going to see, and keep in 
18 mind the type of breach it is. They are always 
19 conflicted because by reporting it they risk that a 
20 parent may go to jail, that he may be punished. I 
21 think Crystal even asked them what's going to happen to 
22 mydad, 
23 So I gness when you look at your common 
24 experiences, and I always call on juries, kind oflook 
25 at common experiences. This is probably one of the 
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1 exceptions. You just have not seen the damaged goods 
. 2 trying to recollect and tell you what happened. They 
3 are subject to cross-examination. They are subject to 
4 speculation. · What I'm going to tell you is I don't 
5 believe children under these circumstances are going to 
6 lie to you. I think you will find the truth. We will 
7 call Barbara Snow •. Barbara. Snow is the grandmother of 
8 these children. And as evidence kind of trickles out · 
· 9 · · through these two or three days, you will find this is 
10 a very dysfunctional family and the parenting · 
11 responsibilities and the obligations of parenting. 
12 I don't particularly disagree with that I think 
13 that's kind of true. Grandmother who just had lost her 
14 husband kind of steps into this family. She's kind of 
· 15 watching after these children. While they're there, 
16 mom is in the women's prison going through a rehab 
17 program for drug abuse. And so grandma has the 
· 18 children in Pocatello and sehooled and kind of watching 
· 19 after them. She wimessed some things during this 
20 period of time, I think we're talking about early part 
21 of 2004, January through.April of2004, when there was 
22 Barbara in Pocatello. Grandma·· she saw things that 
23 she thought was unusual, that just kind of felt was 
24 . disgusting. She'll say she saw the stepfather, the 
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1 and she just looked uncomfortable, kind of squirming, 
2 wanting to get out. She didn't say anything, but she 
3 just was kind of staring at him, What are you doing? 
4 Thenat a later time, or perhaps before this, but 
5 · in that period of time, she goes into the bedroom to go 
6 check on the kids before going to bed, going to bed, 
7 saying good night, I think, and had no idea that Scott 
8 Erickson, the father, was in that room where the 
9 children sleep. He. was under the covers. So as she's 
10 talking to them he pops out from under the covers. He 
11 was under the covers with stepdaughter, Lorissa. 
12 Again, that's just-- I don't like what I'm seeing. 
13 I just don'tlike what that's implying, Had no 
14 information that anything was going on, but just like 
15 any grandma or perhaps grandpa. I'm a grandfather. It 
16 would just be suspicious. What's going on? She was 
17· --then·contacte&by-Jaw,enforcementauthoritysome time 
18 in April and they said that Lorissa, I believe, made a 
19 statement to the resource counselor that she thought 
20 she was being inappropriately touched by her 
21 stepfather. So they start the investigation. She 
22 kicks him out. I don't want you there, get out of 
23 here. I'm not taking that chance. My worse suspicions 
24 have been confirmed about what the granddaughter is 
25 saying. 
29 . 
1 Later on the biological child comes forth and she's 
2 a gal -- some things made me pretty uncomfortable. 
3 Some time in January, February, March, we're not sure, 
4 2004, he had taken her from grandmother's residence in 
5 Pocatello and taken her to his grandparents, or his 
6 parents, in St. Charles, the Ericksons. They had a 
7 trailer home or trailer at their house where he was 
8 living in year round. Mom and dad had separated. Not 
9 divorced, simply separated. 
10 Excuse me. It's my allergy season so I'm taking 
11 meds and my mouth dries out. 
12 In that trailer, her and her brother kind of fight 
13 over who was going to have the edge, but dad is 
14 sleeping with them in the same bed. Brother fights her 
15 · and he gets edge. Dad's in between. After brother 
16 goes to sleep,I think as I reeall her story, dad 
17 starts kind of rubbing her back. Next thing, he's kind 
18 of rubbing her vagina area and buttocks. And I think 
19 he even says he rubs her breast area and then he says, 
20 "Does that make you feel good when daddy rubs you that 
21 way?" Shesaid, "No.Itdoesnot.• 
22 So I believe that the evidence will show Ibey 
23 became sexual objects. And when you see the conflicted 
24 testimony, when you see the strain, emotional strain, 
25 emotional trauma, they go through to come back and have 
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1 to testify to strangers. And we all are strangers to i 
2 them. It's very difficult. But we think the 
3 observations of grandma are critical in making a 
4 decision on this case. 
5 Your job is important to us in law enforcement. 
6 It's important to the prosecutor. We think the 
7 testimony of not just the stepdaughter, but also the 
8 biological daughter, we think when you look at them and 
9 then you say, Well, why in the world would they lie 
10 about that? At that time in their lives he is the 
11 · father. They are emotionally bonded with him. They 
.12 love him. They'll tell you that. 
13 So it starts as a breach of trust, a breach of a 
14 family trust between a parent and child. What you see 
15 testifying are the damaged goods. We think it will end 
16 as a breach of trust because we think we will present a 
17 · ·-convincingcasethatis-proofbeyonda-reasonabledoubt 
18 that he committed these dastardly deeds against these 
19 children of his own. Thank you. · 
20 THE COURT: Mr. Wuthrich, do you want to make your 
21 opening statement at this time? 
22 MR. WUTHRICH: I do. 
23 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
24 MR. WUTHRICH: Well, ladies and gentlemen of the 
25 jury, I, too, wantto thank you for your time. I grew 
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1 up watching Perry Mason. I loved Perry Mason. He'd 
2 get up there and he would just rip the State's 
3 witnesses apart, they would crumble on the stand, and 
4 everybody would know for sure who the guilty party was, 
5 And the State, Mr. Berger, why, he was always crushed 
6 and he never won a case against Perry. That's not 
7 going to happen today. 
8 I also like Law and Order. It's a great, great 
9 show, lots of drama, Jack - I can't remember. McCoy. 
10 Jack McCoy, he gets np there and gives a great policy 
11 argument why this should be a crime. They've always 
12 got these guest defense attorneys and they come in and 
13 give us another policy argument, whether it's a problem 
14 with age or a problem with society, with dealing with 
15 the races, or something like that, why this person 
16 should not be held responsible and then the jury goes 
17 out and makes a big policy judgment. That's not going 
18 to happen either. No, this is going to be much more of 
19 a laborious task for the jurors. You're going to have 
20 to aetuallyweigh the evidence, and you're going to 
21 have to decide credibility of witnesses. 
22 The State said they're going to show these are 
23 damaged goods. These children are damaged goods. 
24 Well, I think I tend to agree with him, but for a 
25 different reason. It's a question of family dynamks. 
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1 law as given in these instructions, whether the 1 complete deliberations, so I will save it for later. 
2 defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offenses 2 All right. Mr. Hehn, you may now make your closing 
3 charged or of any included offense. With respect to 3 argument. 
4 the facts alleged in Count I of the Information, the 4 MR. HELM: Thank you, your Honor. 
5 offense oflewd conduct with a minor under sixteen 5 I think the bus about arrived on time. I think we 
6 includes the offense of sexual abuse of a child. It is 6 told you we thought this would be three or four days. 
7 possible for you to return on C-ount I any one, but only 7 It's going to be three days perhaps. 
8 one, of the following verdicts: Guilty oflewd conduct 8 · Gosh, I really appreciate you taking time from your 
9 with a minor, guilty of sexual abuse of a child, or not 9. families, husbands,jobs, to do this civil duty. I've 
10 guilty of C-ount I. 10 been doing it for 40 years so I know how important it 
11 With respect to the facts alleged in C-ount II of I 11 is in society, in the free society that we live in, 
12 the Information, the offense oflewd conduct with a 12 that we have people willing to sacrifice their time to 
13 minor under sixteen includes the offense of sexual 13 come in and sit in judgment of a fellow person. I 
14 abuse of a child. It is possible for you to return on 14 wouldn't want it any other way. We need common 
15 C-oimt II any one, but only one, of the following 15 everyday people. We need the moms and dads, the 
16 verdicts: Guilty oflewd conduct with a minor, guilty 16 grandpas, the sons and daughters who live on Main 
17- ·-of sexual abuse of a child, not guilty of C-ount II. 17 · Streettotakea1ook atwhat-wedo aslawyers,what we 
18 · With respect to the facts alleged in C-ount III of 18 do as prosecutors, what we do as judges and tell us, 
19 the Information, the offense oflewd conduct with a 19 communicate with us, on what these cases are and what 
20 minor under sixteen includes the offense of sexual 20 it takes for the State to make this case. . 
21 abuse ora child. It is possible for you to return on 21 I told you it's about a breach of trust. It's a 
22 C-ount III any one, but only one, of the following 22 major breach of trust. It's always the theme any time 
23 verdicts: Guilty oflewd conduct with a minor, guilty 23 you have a child that's been molested by a parent. It . 
24 of sexual abuse of a child, not guilty of C-ount -- that 24 will always be the theme. It will never change. 
25 should say C-ount III. 25 Cultures long before we had civilizations, cultures 
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1 When you are deliberating, you should first 1 always protected the children. It was unwritten. 
2 consider the crime charged. You should consider the 2 Children are a protected class. Not only do we protect 
3 included offense only in the event the State has failed 3 them from strangers and outsiders, but we must protect 
4 to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt of the 4 them from our own lustful behaviors. The worst breach 
5 defendant's guilt with respect to the crime charged. 5 of that trust, as I told you in the opening statement, 
6 Do you have the verdict on there next? Yes. Okay, 6 is when a parent breaches that trust fu a sexual 
7 that is the •• the official verdict is this one that 7 manner. 
8 has blue paper behind it. The ones you have, again, 8 Understand when these children testify these many . 
9 are a copy. This is the one that the presiding person 9 years later, the stories are always going to be 
10 · will fill out. 10 somewhat conflicted. And imagine with me the person I 
11 MR. WUTHRICH: Judge, wehavethesametypoon 11 trust has breached that. It is a family that is 
12 . C-ount III and in the verdict form. 12 dysfunctional. Mom openly admits she had a drug 
13 THE COURT: All right. On the official verdict rm 13 problem. Not uncommon in our society today, Mom openly 
14 going to under Count III, the last sentence says not 14 admitted, "I was in rehab. I was trying to get that· 
15 guilty of Countl. rm crossing out Countl and 15 monkey off my back." But. it still left the family, the 
16 putting Count III, and I am initialing it. 16 daughters, col!f)icted. If at 10 and 11 rm first 
17 Gentlemen, do either of you want me to read the 17 contacted and touched inappropriately by that parent, 
18 verdict as it's written? I think the instruction I 18 who do I turn to? Do I even understand that it may be 
19 gave- 19 inappropriate at that time? Ilove that person. I 
20 MR.HELM: Idon'tbelieveso. 20 don't want that person in trouble. I don't want that 
21 THEOOURT: -covers it. 21 person to go to jail, They already bad some of that 
22 MR. HELM: I'm satisfied with that, your Honor, 22 existing within this family·· extended family, I 
23 MR. WUTHRICH: No. 23 should say. We already had Uncle Troy convicted. We 
24 THE COURT: All right. The final instruction is 24 already ha.d Uncle Robert convicted,· They understood if 
25 Instrnction Number 33, That's to be read after you 25 they came forward and testified or told the story that 
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I 1 that may result in their father being punished. That's 1 touched. 
2 a very, very, very difficult position that we would 2 I don't know. You heard a lot of testimony from 
I 3 place a child in. 3 
experts. rm not convinced that experts always help 
4 And you saw what a child goes through. We have 4 us. I think sometimes you just simply believe a 
5 very few interviews. You know, they talked about 12 5 Lorissa, you believe a Crystal, or you just don't 
II 6 interviews and usually there is a minimum of 12 6 believe them, I believe their stories·· I still have 7 interviews. Not near that many interviews here. 7 my allergies, excuse me. I believe that their 
8 Whoever they told the story to first, I believe in this 8 testimony is very credible. Does that mean a defense 
I 9 case we had a school counselor they told it to. They 9 attorney or a defendant can't punch a little bit here, 10 brought in the people, Detective Volhner, that 10 punch a little bit here, peck a little bit here? It's 
11 specialize in larger cities. Crystal told it to her 11 always the case with children. It's always the case 
I 12 grandmother. Butwhowasinthepositionoftrustin . · 12 with children, They're not an eyewitness. They are 13 Crystal's life at that time? Mom's in rehab. Dad's 13 the subjects of the intrusion and to their privacy and 
14 the perpetrator. They typically will talk to that 14 the most personal things to them by the trust of the 
I 15 person that they feel comfortable with. That person 15 parent 16 they have some volume of trust with. That turned out 16 They're not the distant observer, Yes, I saw him 
· 17··-tobe·grandma;-Mrs. Snow,Susie. ·· ······ --- · 17 · -leave the-ba:nki I-sawhim-with.a-gun,..1-saw.him hit. I 
I 18 She told you before she got the message from 18 am the distant observer. I'm telling you what I saw. 19 Crystal that she just saw things that made her 19 That is never true in child molestation cases. If you 
-
20 uncomfortable. She saw that hugging from behind. Not 20 want that real clean slate that has no imperfections in 
21 face-to-face, but the hugging from behind. She saw 21 it, that has no possibilities, you'll never get it in 
22 what she thought was an uncomfortable feeling by her 22 child molestation cases. This prosecutor and the 
-
23 daughter·· or by her granddaughter. Did she see 23 prosecutor will always have that difficulty. It does 
24 anything illegal? No. I hug my granddaughters. I hug 24 not exist I told you that in my opening statement I 
25 my daughters. But just the look upon her face, the 25 prepared you for that. You saw it You will believe 
-
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1 suspicion that a grandmother and mother may have. Not 1 or disbelieve. 
2 enough to make an issue, but just simply hum. 2 I don't know that I go back to read jury 
- 3 And then a second time she finds when she 3 instructions. We spend a lot of time reading them, but 4 thought·· Scott was staying there when mom was 4 there has always been an instruction that I see given 5 rehabing. She goes back to the bedroom to check on the 5 that's iµven by this Court, too, Instruction Number,5 I 6 kids and out from under the covers he pops. She's 6 of the original set; and I'll just read the second page 7 . glaring at him. Didn't say anything. Didn't really 7 because I think child cases when we're talking about 
8 see anything, but just did not like it. Thoughtit was 8 molestation, really keep this in mind. "There is no 
I 9 wrong. What's Scott's reaction to that? Grabs his bag 9 magieal formula by which one may evaluate testimony. 10 and he gets out the door. Grabs his bags and leaves. 10 You bring with you to this courtroom all of the 
11 Before she had a chance to question, before she had a 11 experiences and background in your lives. In your 
I 12 chance to kick him out, grabbed it and left. That 12 everyday affairs you determine for yourself whom you 13 doesn't sound innocentto a grandmother. It's not 13 believe, what you believe and how much weight you 
I 
14 goingtosoundinnocenttoamother. Itwasnot · 14 attach to what you are told. The same considerations 
15 innocent 15 that you use in your everyday dealings in.making these 
16 . Unfortunately, later on after the story went in to 16 decisions are the considerations which.you should apply 
I 
17 the school counselor and then to the I think deputy 17 in these deliberations." Simple, straightforward and 
18 sheriff in Bannock County, she finds out her worst 18 perhaps the essence of your duties. We can't give you a 
19 fears. Now here's a lady who lost her husband of 19 magic guideline that tells you that, 
I 
20 · several years to cancer, 2003, September. Her daughter 20 Let's talk about some of these things when we look 
21 is in rehab. She is that safety net She is that· 21 at the children involved in this, and rm going to 
22 extended family. And then she finds out what she had 22 start out with some of the experts. I thought the 
I 23 observed, what had raised the hairs on the back of her 23 experts at times helped, but I thought at times it was 24 head, what was going on here became her worst fear, her 24 burdensome, almost boring. I want to go back to some 
25 worst nightmare. Her granddaughters were being 25 differentiation between the experts. 
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1 As I recall, Mydell Yeager, the lady we called, 1 couldn't hear it because I'm over there. I asked her 
2 said she was an actual licensed counselor, that she 2 to repeat it. She didn't wantto repeat it. Am Ito 
3 . specialized in counseling children of sexual abuse, 3 suggest now that this is not sexual in his eyes? Would 
4 that she had had approximately three thousand cases, 4 any of you not believe this is lewd and lascivious, 
5 She was still actively involved in counseling these 5 this is not sexual battery of a minor? Would you allow 
6 kids. She had testified for several different 6 your daughters and your granddaughters? None of us 
7 jurisdictions within the State ofidaho as an expert. 7 would. We would be irate. 
8 She told you that s.ometimes when kids are confronted by 8 Lorissa; I think you could probably sit there and 
9 a total stranger,just clear out of the blue, that they 9 pick and pick and pick and pick and, well, she said 
10 willinitially deny it. Isn't that Crystal? Had no 10 that one time, one time she said it that way. Well, 
11 idea that she's going to be confronted by a police 11 isn't she recanting? Let's go back and look. Let's 
12 officer and asked about her father. 12 look at everything here. Let's not just pick here and 
13 The initial reaction I think almost always in that 13 pick here. Let's look what's going on, When she's u 
14 case is not going to be that unusual, You're going to 14 years old·· I thinkCrystal was 10 when this 
15 deny. The officer is not somebody you know, It's not 15 happened •• Crystal I think·· or not Crystal but 
16 somebody you trust. I think she was "· going to get 16 Lorissa explained she was 11. And maybe it starts out 
17 her age right, I think she was about 13 or 14 when she 17 with a slap on the butt, kind of a hug, maybe 
18 was confronted with this. You just •• what would you 18 just·· do you really know what's going on? When did 
19 say? You use your common sense. Put yourself in that 19 you get uncomfortable with it? How far does your 
20 position. What would you say? Even if you had been 20 father have to go before you're uncomfortable with it, 
21 abused 11nd somebody out of the clear blue just knocks 21 you know? 
22 on the door and asks about your father, you would 22 She talks about specific things. She talks about 
23 probably deny it. 23 she thought it was going on all the time. In her mind 
24 You would then go to a person you trust. Mom's not 24 it is. Every time he might even be giving her a hug 
25 there, grandma is. You might start your disclosure 25 and nothing intended at.all. But why? Because of the 
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1 then. I don't find that unusual at all, I don't find 1 prior touching that she was very uncomfortable'with 
2 that surprising. I don't find that justification for 2 that was illegal, inappropriate. What might be just a 
3 not believing what Crystal told us. Does that now 3 hug suddenly becomes •• she becomes very, very, 
4 mean - I mean, what is her motive for getting up and 4 uncomfortable with ordinary life from the person whom 
5 lying under oath about what her father did to her? Why 5 had done the things to her, from the person who had 
6 in the world would Crystal lie in that situation? Ask 6 fondled her breast, had fondled her buttocks. 
7 yourself that. Why would that girl lie in that 7 Is she confused? I think one time she told the 
8 situation? Because if she's telling the truth; he's 8 officer it was her breast, it was underneath her pants,· 
9 guilty. The only way he's not guilty is you have to 9 panties it was on the outside. She couldn't remember 
10 accept she decided to get tip and lie to us all, 10 for sure. She thought they were both on the outside 
11 People lie for motives, for reasons. I suggest to 11 when she testified. Does that mean she's not 
12 you she's telling you the exact truth, Do not find her 12 believable? Absolutely not •. We heard what both 
13 story not credible because she initially denied it to a 13 experts said. The ability to reeall specifics by the 
14 · strange police officer. She told it in Bright 14 way the mind works just doesn't work that way. They 
15 Tomorrow. She told th.e story in the preliminary 15 cannot give you dates. I'm not required to prove a 
16 hearing, She told her story here. There is no 16 specific date and time. They kind of remember the 
17 recanting of it. Oh, we can talk about locations, 17 event. They remember their feelings. They seek the 
18 times, but she was pretty detailed, wasn't she? She 18 repressant, If it was a stranger and they were 10 or. · 
19 knew there, she knew where she was at, shelmew she was 19 11, they would have reported it right away. There is 
20 at grandma and grandpa's in St. Charles, she knew her 20 no conflict there, What the guy did in the park when 
21 brother was there, she knew her dad was there, she knew 21 he offered you a piece of candy, they would report it. 
22 where she was, kind of in the bed barely going to 22 It's when it involves a loved one that they hesitate to · 
23 sleep, she kiiew how the touching started, rubbing her 23 report it, that they become conflicted. Maybe nobody 
24 breasts, buttocks and then this, "How does it feel when 24 believes me, 
25 daddy rubs you there?" And she started to cry. I 25 She talked atlength. If it helps you decide the . 
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I 1 credibility of this case and the witnesses, use that. 1 saw my cousins come forward, do take the stand, go 2 I goess when I look at his 200 cases, none for 12 2 through what they eventually went through. They 
I 
3 years, I just think there is a major, major difference 3 survived, maybe I can come forward and talk about it 
4 in the experience. It reminds me of somebody who 4 It wouldn't have encouraged false testimony. It 
5 wanted to learn to ranch a farm. I can go to the 5 wouldn't have encouraged false reporting. ft would be 
I 
6 person who's practiced farming with his father, with 6 just the opposite. He had to admit that He only gave 
7 his grandfather, has milked the cows, has raised the 7 us one side. Yes, contagion can work both ways. 
8 crops, cut the hay, branded the cattle, brought cattle 8 Sometimes encourages people to come forward and tell 
I 9 in, and I can have him talk to me about farming, about 9 the truth. Show and tell, or bad touching/good 10 what you need to do to rear cattle, what you need to do 10 touching in elementary schools. Sometimes kids come 
11 to have a good crop, whento harvest, cut your hay, or 11 forward and start talking about it. · 
I . 12 I can talk to the person who went to school, got a 12 She said four in three thousand she thought had 13 doctor's degree and read about it. We would always 13 reason to believe were false reporting of sexual abuse. 
14 choose the hands-on expert. 14 That's almost statistically insignificant. His own 
I 15 In common everyday living conditions, if I wanted a 15 statistics were almost identical. I was looking at I 16 mechanic to work on my car, I want somebody that's had 16 think slide 15 and it said 15 or 25 percent then 
17 experience. I don't want to downplay formal training, 17·· ··· divorce;·butit-didn!tsaywhat-kindofabuse.·Ifyou 
I 18 but I'm saying when it gets right down to the brass 18 read the fine print·· and we're talking about nine 19 tacks, I like the formal training but I really want 19 thousand people that were interviewed and did this 
20 somebody who is a hands-on expert. Don't bore me with 20 study-· of those 129 had allegations of some type of 
I 21 all that. "If I took what he said, Mr. Rybicki, I 21 sexual abuse. The other abuse didn't include·· they 22 couldn't prosecute anybody. There would always be some 22 included all types of abuse, you know. Sexual abuse was 
23 little thing that's not perfect. Or am I supposed to 23 129 out of 9000. Of that 50 percent of them were six 
I 24 get me a doctor of psychology with a background in 24 or younger. That's not this case. They were all over 25 forensic interviews and bring them in here? When a 25 that. . We know young children six and younger are 
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I 1 child comes, "Oh, don't say anything. I've got to get 1 subject to a lot of manipulation and suggestion. I'm 
2 a doctor to interview you. I can't do anything until 2 not disagreeing with him on that. Of those they believe 
I 3 we've got a recording and a person trained." It 3 about 33 percent may have some basis in fact. When you 4 doesn't work that way in the real world. It's just not 4 run the arithmetic on that, it comes out almost 
5 . practical. 5 identical, 12 and 9000. That's the same as 4 and 3,000 
I 6 Don't let them persuade you that this is a weak 6 almost right down to a level. 7 case because we're not doing what their expert thought 7 So even the study that they tried to convince us 
8 we should do. It's a strong case because these 8 because this was a conflict divorce, I'm not sure it 
I 9 witnesses, Lorissa and Crystal, are believable. And 9 always qualified as a conflict divorce because most 10 .. they took a lot of shots at them, a lot of 10 divorces are settled without conflict. There wasn't a 
11 cross-examination, a lot of anger, hard to control. It . 11 lot of custody disputes going on. I would tell you 
I 12 came out in chunks and bites. She should be angry. I 12 that we do look at that as prosecutors and police 13 understand her anger. Don't judge her because she · 13 officers when we got divorces and custody battles and 
14 showed emotion or anger. She should show that. If 14 wegettheseallegations. Weknowfromour 
I 15 that helps her heal, helps her get by it, then she 15 experiences, we know from Dr. Mydell Yeager's people, 16 should show it. Don't use that as a reason notto 16 let's look at that. Don't turn a blind eye to it 
17 believe her. Don't use the expert. Ahha; it's 17 That's not news to me. That's not new to me. We look 
I 18 possible, it's possible, it's possible. 18 at it very carefully. To suggest we just don't look at 19 But when you get down to it, what was the one 19 ·. it is just not true. I've been here too long. I've 
I 
20 thing? Contagion. Never heard that term before. You 20. seen too inany cases. I look at it. 
21 know that it was a contagion thing because Uncle Troy 21 But rve got two saying it, not just one. We have 
22 had been convicted. I think Crystal testified in that 22 one family member, same age group, complaining about 
1-
23 case. Uncle Robert had admitted and was convicted and . 23 the UJtcle, the grandfather, in this case the father • 
24 now they've come forward with false testimony. It 24 Who else did you have access to, they complained, no 
25 would be the opposite. They would be encouraged. · I 25 . problems, another red flag. Huh, do I go forth on this? 
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1 Youknow,seriouscharges. Youwanttomakesureyou 1 
2 look at them before you at least do prosecution. 2 
3 Two here. Both the children •• and while Lorissa is 3 
4 a stepchild, that's really the only father she's ever 4 
5 had. I think you'll have Exhibit2. Exhibit2 kind of 5 
6 portrays gililt feelings. There is no recanting ofit. 6 
7 She loved him to pieces. Just really bad about what 7 
8 she said, opened my mouth, it came out. But she does 8 
9 not say that it is false, I'm sorry I lied about it. 9 
10 Andnotapartialrecanting. Idon'tknow. Ireadit. 10 
11 I don't see anything in there that suggests it didn't 11 
12 happen, It's just a conflicted child and has some - 12 
13 and that's understandable, That's why I went back over 13 
14 that instruction. 14 
15 Think about your own experiences. Think about your 15 
16 childhoods. Think about your roles as parents, 16 
17 grandparents.-Y-ouknow,-how-would-you-feel? Howwould 17 
18 you feel knowing that your testimony might put your 18 
19 father through that, somebody you love, I find it 19 
20 prettycommon. Idon'tfindthatextraordinary, I 20 
21 don'tfintl that for a reason not to believe her. It 21 
22 gives her credibility, It's emotional. It's real. It 22 
23 adds to that credibility. · 23 
24 I don't know that I've ever used that argument as a 24 
25 reasonnottobelieveher. Shetoldyouaboutthe 25 
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from under the bed covers. 
What is that child going to do now? You know, I 
got away from it and now I'm kind of back in it again a 
few months later, six or seven months later, You are 
probably going to think abouttelling somebody. You 
might go in with your friend to talk to the resource 
officer, Mrs. Oaks-· I can't remember her name for 
sure - and my stepdad is touching me inappropriately 
and I'm uncomfortable with the way he touches me. You 
might ring the bell. What did she keep saying? I just 
want it to go away, I just want it to go away, In her 
tears and her anger, I just wantitto go away, 
And that's what you see there, isn't it? It went 
away because mom moves out and then it came back. I 
just wantitto go away. She didn't wantto follow 
through with it,just wanted itto go away. I don't 
want-to-file charges,-Idon'twant to-see him go to 
jail. Just stop it. Get me someplace where I'm safe 
and secure, Give me a sanctuary. If you don't find a 
sanctuary, if you can't escape it, then you are going 
to complain. Are you going to be conflicted? At times 
I think. I thought she was very believable. If you 
caunot believe two of them saying their father started 
the same thing about the same age, 10 and 11, what 
would you do if you just had one? Sometimes we do. 
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1 telephone conversation. I think that's something else 
they're going to pounce on and suggest. Is that a 
retraction or recanting? And I understand when it's a 
father or parental figure who's perpetrating the crime 
recanting is not uncommon, Not uncommon and we can 
understand why if you think aboutyour own conflicted 
emotions as a child in that situation, especially the 
dysfunctiona:lity of this family, 




















But even then there is not a recall of that. She 
doesn'tsay, "Ididn'tdoit." Shesays, "Ididn't 
have a molestation problem." She didn't, That's 
abs9lutely true. At that time in.her life, and she . 
explained what she meant, she did .not have a 
molestation problem. He was gone. Health and Welfare 
kicked him out. Told Barbara, ;'Can't be around them. 
You gotto protect these children, We've gotto step 
in until we find out what's going on." So in her mind 
she didn't Butlookatthis, Whenshe'slivingin 
2 totally, but somewhat easier.than if you had one child 
3 ta:lking aboutit. 
4 · Here there is a pattern. Here there is a history, · · 
5 But not as Dr. Rybicki said to imply a negative or 
6 . false reporting, but the history when you look at it, . 
7 the uncles that have abused children within this 
8 family. I think they're believable. I think they're 
9 very believable. And I think when you hear their 
10 testimony it just -just put yourself there a little 
11 bit. What was to be going through a child's mind when 
12 they'reputinthissituation? Itdidhappen, 
13 And think what else we had there at the end when we 
14 go backtosomeofTammy's. Well, they'retryingto 
15 makeTammylooklikesomemonster. Well,shegother 
16 children to do that The children filed this falsely 
17 and made this a:ll up because mom's mad at dad. I 
18 thoughtshewasaprettygoodmom. Iknowalotof • 
I 21 22 
23 
1- ~: 
St. Charles as a family unit the molestation starts, 
begins. Then when mom moves out to Soda she said it 
didn't happen anymore, I'm a:ll right, I don't have to 
go to the authorities. Then when mom has to go in to 
rehab she moves in with grandma and there is dad again 
19 moms and a lot of mothers, including my own wife, that 
20 would have been far, far more angry than that. Put 
21 yourself there. No child.support, dealing with the 
22 . drug problem, comes and takes the car, try to get it 
23 back,jumps in it, won't get out, comes back, well, 
I 
· starting down the same path. That's when she saw the 
hug from behind from her dad. That's when lie pops out 
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24 it'scommunityproperty, we can't remove it. Man, 














1 dealing with a drug problem, trying to get it behind 
2 you, And then you find out the father, a trusted 
3 person hopefully, may be or is touching your daughter. 
4 Pretty tough. Do you talk to that person? 
5 I thought she showed remarkable control, I didn't 
6 see I thought this raging maniac who was willing to use 
7 her kids to get back at him. I mean, that's the 
8 defense in part. That's a fantasy world. It doesn't 
9 exist. Good heavens. This happened what, 2004? And 
10 she got out. Separated in 2003, we're just now getting 
11 divorcefiled. Yeah,shewantedacar. Yeah,shewas 
12 upset. Hewouldn'tletherhaveit, Sheneededit. 
13 Gosh, I got to go to work. Somebody has got to support 
14 these kids. I won't be on Welfare all my life. Help 
15 me. Give me a car. He took it away from her and then 
16 runs her down, chased her down with the police when she 
. 17 .. -C3llle.down and.got-the truck.and this.is.now- - ---
18 justification? It's 2006. It's already happened. 
19 You know, I just don't believe when you look at the 
20 statistical sampling of false reports by My dell Yeager 
21 and the defense expert that it's not here. Two of them 
22 suddenly to support mom because dad's been mean to her, 
23 we're going to make up these stories and help put dad 
24 injail. 







went and talked to him. He called her up and asked her 
to come down. Hum, .that's interesting. What did he 
want? You know I didn't do it. You know I didn't do 
6 
I ~ 
it. What was the condition? If you'd go to Health and 
Welfare, if you go _to your mom, if you go to the kids 
and get them to drop this, you can have it all. You 
can have everything. You don 'tjust get the truck or 
the car, you can have it all. Not an admission of 
I fo 
11 
I 12 _ 13 
14 
I .. 15 16 
17 






guilt, but certainly if you look at your own 
experiences it bothers me. T\iat the argument here is 
you can't have the truck, I need the truck. He's in 
jail. It's connnlll1ityproperty, If you can get this 
all dismissed, go to Health and Welfare, get the kids 
to dismiss this, you can have it all. 
Ladies and gentlemen of this jury, we believe and 
I'm telling you, the State has presented a convincing 
case. A perfect case, never, I'll never present a 
perfect~. Certainly not when I have child victims. 
It is a strong case. I believe it is convincing beyond 
a reasonable doubt. He did what we accused hint of. 
Thankyou. 
THE COURT: Mr. Wuthrich. 
MR. WUTHRICH: Thankyou. 
MR. HELM: let me get my cup, Steve, out of your 
way. 
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1 MR. WUTIIRICH: Thankyou. 
2 Well, Itoowanttothankyouforyourtime. Some 
3 days are long. Itold you it wouldn't be as dramatic 
4 as either Perry Mason or Jack McCoy. Much more like 
5 moving pipe, trudging through the mud, swatting 
6 mosquiters. But there is a lot of evidence here and I 
7 need to go over some of it again, so bear with me, 
8 we'll trudge a little more .. 
9 Mr. Hehn brought up the statistics that Dr. Rybicki 
10. testified to, and I want to read the rest of that 
11 because he didn't quite tell it all. He said among 129 
12 allegation cases- and actually it was two percent of 
13 the 9,000 custody eases there was an allegation of 
14 sexual abuse. So about 180 eases that was actual 
15 allegations of sexual abuse. He said among the 129 
16 allegations, 50 percent were believed to involve sexual 
17- · -abuse; 17-pereent-hadinsufficientevidence, 33 percent 
18 were deemed unlikely. Not the two percent, not the 
19 four out of 3,000, was it, that Mydell Yeager testified 
20 to, She'd seen more and that's because she's a 
21 clinician. That's what she does. She treats abuse 
22 victims. So she looks at it with those eyeglasses. 
23 All things must be abuse. She doesn't look at it to 
. 24 examine are there any problems here, is there any 
25 credibility issues. She treats abuse victims, She 
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1 proceeds on the assumption that they're abused and she 
2 tries to help and treat them. And that's a good thing 
3 and we need those people in the world, but that doesn't 
4 mean that she brings objectivity to the table. 
5 Mr, Hehn says, well, you don't want a rancher that 
6 hasn't been out on a ranch. And you want a mechanic--
? · youwanttotakeyoureartoamechanic. Well, this 
8 isn't a mechanic case. This is an engineering case. 
9 We're not asking you to fix the children. We're asking 
10 you to diagnose what happened here, to figure out why 
11 the bridge fell down, And that's not for a mechanic to 
12 do, that'sforanengineertodo. 
13 So we brought a different expert. And he's pointed 
14 outtoyouanumberofthingsandanumberoffactors · 
15 that he thinl\:s you should consider in a case like this, 
16 a number of factors that might contaminate or ruin the 
17 results. If you recall, he talked about the first . 
18 factor was the accusing parent. And one of those was, 
19 isthereretaliationbytheaccusingparent? Well, we. 
20 don't have in essence an accusing parent in this ease, 
21 but we have a suspicious grandma. Now, grandma observe 
22 a hugging that looks bothersome to her. Don't know if 
23 any of you had teenage girls as they grow up, but as 
24 your little girls grow up they reach a point in time in 
25 which there are new boundaries. What used to be 
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1 tickling and fun and wrastling and playing around with 1 situation or a separation scenario. 
2 them is no longer touching. And it happens between 2 But that's not a reason to convict him of these 
3 moms and boys, too. They just don't want to be kissed 3 kind of charges, just being a bad parent, which is the 
4 no more when they reach adolescence. Don't do that. 4 second factor that Dr. Rybicki talked about and that is 
5 Oh, I won't anymore, 5 the accused parent. Does he have parenting deficits? 
6 So what she may have observed to be perfectly 6 Well, yeah, he does. He wasn't thinking, acted out of 
7 innocent is the maturation process of a young girl 7 rage and anger at his wife at times, he's taken cars 
8 reaching her teenage years and no longer wanting to be 8 back from her, they're having property disputes. All 
9 hugged by her stepdad, a new setting of boundaries 9 of this is going on and it's impacting these children. 
10 between them misinterpreted by grandma. Could be wholly 10 It's making them madder. Mom's left without cars. All 
11 innocent. 11 of these factors these children are being brought into 
. 12 Now, the second thing she observes is the popping 12 and brought a part of and they shouldn't have been, and 
13 out from under the covers. There is three kids in the 13 that's his parenting deficits. But again, ladies and 
14 room. There is no serious allegation that anything was 14 gentlemen of the jury, it's not a reason to convict him 
15 going on then, but grandma is now all mad at him and he 15 of these kinds of serious charges. 
16 leaves. I'd leave too if somebody accused me of 16 Now, the third factor that Dr. Rybicki talked about 
17 · inappropriately-touching my.child. l'dbe-mad andl-- -· . 17 -was-c-0ntagion. Dowe-have contagion here? We got a 
18 probably wouldn't throw a scene in front of the 18 lot of contagion. We have contagion because the two 
19 children, so he leaves. Is that an admission that 19 cousins, Shaylee and Heather Hess, had already raised 
20 something happened? Well, she isn't seriously 20 allegations of abuse. But contrary to what the 
21 asserting anything happened then. He just came out from 21 · prosecutor told you, they had not been prosecuted when 
22 the covers and she wasn't expecting it, but there were 22 these original allegations took place, were asserted, 
23 three kids in that room and in that bed. 23 · in 2004. The prosecution didn't take place for Troy and 
24 The caretaker, Barbara Snow, said that she let 24 Robert until 2005 and that was in Dr. Rybicki's time 
25 Scott come and stay in the Pocatello home because 25 line. So these kids didn't know that dad would go to 
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1 Bubba, James, wouldn't stay without his dad. She's left 1 jail. These kids did know that their cousins had 
2 with this responsibility to care take for these 2 raised issues of abuse. More importantly, however, a 
3 children while.mom's in jail. She doesn't really have 3 peer had raised allegations of abuse and that's what 
4 custody. Dad has custody rights and one of the kids 4 Lorissa told her grandma at the very beginning. 
5 wants to live with him so she lets Scott live with him. 5 "Grandma, I went in with a friend to say that her 
6 She's in a precarious position. Is she retaliatory? We 6 stepfather had been touching her and they got it all 
7 don't know. What we do know, and by Tammy Erickson's 7 twisted around and now they think it's me." That was 
8 . own words, is that she was very angry when they 8 her first statement to grandma, the person she trusted •. 
9 separated in 2003. We do know that the children 9 That was her first statement. 
10 believed that mom turned - or that dad turned mom in 10 She's been interviewed at least once by the school, 
11 for drug abuse. We do know that as a result of that 11 and we don't have a copy of that. She's then 
12 Tammy was arrested and Tammy went off to drug rehab. 12 interviewed by Detective Vollmer, We don't have a 
13 We do know that that hurt that family and that hurt 13 recording of that, although that was her typical 
14 those children and we know that those children were 14 policy, Detective Vollmer says that Lorissa says she 
15 angry at their father. 15 was touched. She was touched under the clothing on her 
16 In fact, they believe their father is stalking 16 breasts and over the clothing on her butt, that it all 
17 their mother, He's putting bugs on their car, That's 17 took place in St. Charles, that none ofittook place 
18 their attitude towards their father. So do they want 18 in Pocatello; that Scott wasn't living with them at 
19 him to come back and live with them? No. No, the two 19 that time, that he had been arrested and gone to jail. 
20 girls don't because they're aljgned with mom. They're 20 And they go and they inte.rview Crystal. Crystal says 
21 aligned with mom. They don'twanthim back there. Does 21 no, nothing has happened to me, No, nothing has 
22 that make him a good parent? No. No, he probably 22 happened. And soon Detective Vollmer does her job, 
23 should have foreseen the pain it would cause his · 23 does a dettnt interview on her, 
24 children ifhe turns his wife in for drugs and causes 24 So there has been contagion because Lorissa has 






















1 even Crystal acknowledges that she knows that her 
2 cousins have been touched, but that she hasn't been 
3 touched. Then she goes home and they talk with 
· 4 grandma. And only after she talks with both grandma 
5 and Crystal -- or I mean, Lorissa, does Crystal then 
6 say, "Yeah, I've been touched, too." ls that group 
7 contagion? Could there be any more group contagion? 
8 Only after she talks with grandma. 
9 Now grandma may be looking through rose-colored 
10 eyes. You know, I'm not saying that grandma 
11 intentionally sets out to manipulate these children. 
12 Bullet's admit it. It's convenient for grandma that 
13 these kids have been touched because that's a way of 
14 keeping Scott away from them. That's a way of 
15 maintaining this custody that's very fragile to her 
16 while her daughter is in rehab. And she's trying to 
· 17 ·me care ·of1lrese kidsforher·daughter·and restore 
18 thatfamilyto her daughter when she gets out. And 
19 she's in a very fragile situation so it is convenient. 
20 So we have a number ofcontagion. We have peer 
21 contagf on, the cousins, the friend and the role figure 
22 of grandma. 
23 Now, the last thing that he mentioned is context 
24 and in what context did the allegation arise. And 
25 Dr. Helm -- or Mr. Helm didn't want you to look at 
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1 January of 2004. They've been living in Soda, just 
2 recently moved to Pocatello, now they're living with 
3 grandma. They've been living in an environment where 
4 they have been alienated from dad, angered at dad, 
5 promoted against dad, and he wants to move in the house 
6 now. He wants to come back and stay with them. Are they 
7 angry? Yeah. Does abuse come along as a pretty good 
8 way to get dad out of here? 
9 The next one that Dr. Rybicki talked about is you 
10 got to look at implausibility. Let's talk about terms 
11 of plausibility. The story of2001; the four children · 
12 will get off the school bus in St. Charles, they'll 
13 walk to their home. Tammy now says, Well, two of them 
14 might have gone over to grandpa and grandma Glade's, 
15 That might account for two of them, it doesn't account 
16 for the other one. Lorissa can't tell us why she's 
17- --suddenly-at ,r.30-she!s walking in-to the housealone, 
18 But she said she walked in, she put her bag down on the 
19 kitchen table and then he starts touching her. Just 
20 out of the blue. Is that plausible? He doesn't groom 
21 herinanyway. Hedoesn'taskherquestions. He 
22 doesn't come up to her and just start giving her a back 
23 rub or something like that. She says he walks right 
24 over and starts fondling her. Is it plausible? · 
25 One of the things that Dr. Rybicki talked about 
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1 Dr. Rybicki's discussion of that because context here 1 that was real important was grooming things, you know. 
Had the parent been grooming the child for a while? 
Had he slowly introduced touching or sexual themes or 
talked about sex or bribery or those kinds of things 
where he had some control over this child and would 
think that he could get away with this? Or did he at 
least threaten her or in any way tell her not to say, 
2 is bad. It's not in the actual filing of divorce, but 2 
3 it's in the separation of the family. It's in the 3 
4 alienation of the father and it's in the alignment of 4 
5 the mother. Now what evidence do we.have of that? 5 
6 Well, contrary to what Tammy Erickson told you that she 6 
7 never kept her kids from Scott, Scott spends every 7 
8 weekend of the entire summer of2003 after they 8 
9 separated with his cousin, Audra Bell, in Afton because 9 
10 he doesn't have visitation with his kids. In fact, he 10 
11 leaves one time to go over and see Tammy. 11 
12 He doesn't have visitation with his kids. They're 12 
13 angry. Even mom admits those children believe dad 13 
14 turned her in to the cops for drugs. They believe that, 14 
15 . They're angry. She promotes that anger. Lorissa said 15 
. 16 shesawthebugonthecarthatdadisstalkingher 16 
·· 17 with and Crystal tells the New Beginnings lady my dad 17 
18 · is stalking my mom. Are they aligned with mom? Better 18 
19 believeit. Context. Wehavetheworstpossible 19 
20 context. 20 
· 21 Sodotheyhaveamotivetolie? Well, they do. 21 
22 James apparently wants to stay with dad and dad keeps 22 
23 coming around and they're mad at dad. They're aligning 23 
24 withtheirmom. Theydon'twanttobewithdad, 24 
25 They've been living with mom since June of 2003 till 25 
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. to tell? None of that here. If we believe her story, 
she walks in, she sets down her bag and dad just starts 
over and starts groping her out of the clear blue. ls 
. it plausible? 
The next one, 2002, she says happened in the . 
trailer behind Margaret and Glade's house. We 
introduced Exhibit 2. They didn't buy the trailer until 
December of 2003. Glade testified he had to sign-off 011 
the loan. Mrs. Snow testified she sold it to him and 
then after they paid her she gave him the title and he 
came within a day or two and picked up the trailer. . 
That's December of 2003, Th.at trailer isn't at 
Margaret and Glade's, but that's what this witness, 
Lorissa Hottel, said she was abused in 2002 in that 
trailer. It wasn't there. 
So they put on Tammy to try to say, Well, Margaret 
and Glade have other trailers, they have their own car 
trailers. Why would Scott be sleeping in there? In 
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1 fact, why would Scott and Lorissa be sleeping at 1 very protective. Is that realistic? Can you imagine 
2 Margaret and Glade's in 2002 at all? They only live a 2 doing that yourself with your girls? 
3 block down the street. Why wouldn't they be sleeping 3 Context. Let me tell you what context is here. As 
4 in their own house? Is it credible? Is it believable? 4 long as the mom is out of jail and able to take care of 
5 Maybe she got her year wrong. Well, but wait a minute. 5 these kids, nothing is happening, nothing is being 
6 2003 she had already left. They still don't have the 6 pursued. When mom goes to jail the first time, the 
7 trailer. In fact, dad continues to live in the home 7 allegations are made and it keeps Scott away from those 
8 after they separate until the house is foreclosed on. 8 children, then mom comes back and nothing happens in 
9 That's about four months. That's right about the time 9 regard to that. And then in 2006 when she goes back to 
10 he buys the trailer. 10 · jail, he goes to try and assert his custodial rights, 
11 So; is it believable? And that's an important 11 this issue is raised again. That's the context. There 
12 thing. You've gotto ask that in context of these 12 is abuse allegations when mom is gone and unavailable 
13 allegations because this is an extremely susceptible 13 to take care of these kids and there is no abuse 
14 situation. We're talking about divorce, we're talking 14 allegations when mom is here and able to take custody 
15 about separation, we're talking about break up of a 15 of those children. That's a dangerous context, ladies 
16 family. We got lots of emotions flying around and 16 and gentlemen. 
17 ·certainly in1his·case-we-gotlots·ofangers going···· 17 · -·I wanHotalk aboutacoupJe.oHhejury 
18 around and we got lots of side-taking going around. 18 instructions. Well, let me close a little bit with 
19 Let's look at Lorissa's testimony. She first tells 19 Dr. Rybicki. He said the factors in this case were not 
20 her gramdma it's a big mistake. She then tells the 20 adequately considered and that the investigatiim was 
21 police officer, no, it happened, but only in Bear Lake 21 not properly done according to standards. And he 
22 under her clothing. Then she writes her dad and says 22 pointed to standards they have, standards in abuse 
23 she's sorry she said anything. She tells her cousin 23 allegation cases. Mydell Yeager; she's not a member of 
24 Melissa Lish, no, she said it only because her friend 24 that group so she doesn't have to point to any 
25 was making the same allegation against his stepfather. 25 standards. She can go by her intuition and her 
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1 She tells her Aunt Janette and her cousin Larry, no, 1 experience. All of which is with abuse victims, very 
2 it's all lies. She tells the Court at the pretrial she 2 little of which is with false reporting cases. Of 
3 can only remember it happening three times. And she 3 course, she acknowledges she might not know because she 
4 tells officer Martinez in this interview, no, it 4 isn't looking for that. She isn't looking for false 
5 happened all the time. We're not talking about little 5 reporting so she might not see it. Dr. Rybicki is 
6 discrepancies. We're talking about day and night. 6 trying to be objective and look on both sides of the · 
7 We're talking about events she either says happens all 7 coin, false cases and true cases. And he talked about 
8 the time or she can only tell it happened three times. 8 that, different dynamics and the different · 
9 That's a major difference. And if it happened under 9 possibilities you might have in this case. 
10 the clothing, why would she say now it only happened 10 I agree children are a protected class and they 
11 over the clothing? Very strange. 11 ought to be protected from bad parenting as well. But 
12 Now, the mother admits further in context when she 12 that's not the crime we're here to deal with. Mom does 
13 came back in July of 2004, she and Scott tried to get 13 have a drug problem. No question about it. She's had 
14 back together again. She believes that these 14 problems with it. Bnt to a great extent these children 
15 allegations by her daughters are true. She tries to 15 blame dad for mom's absence in the home. Grandma saw 
16 get back together with the guy or does she believe what 16 things that she thought were uncomfo\'blble, but they're 
17 Scott told her that somebody had come and interviewed 17 just as easily explained by maturity as they are by 
18 him and they had been dropped? Is that more credi'ble 18 anything, any abuse allegations. 
19 than what she told you here today? 19 And it's ironic. They've scoured their history as 
20 The other one that's truubling to me is if Grandma 20 a family and they come np with two things that were 
21 Snow really believes this happened, why does she say 21 observed by someone else that they think is suggestive 
22 that she then sent Crystal off to a birthday party with 22 that abuse is going on here and that's the 
23 the Ericksons? If she really believes this happened, 23 uncomfortable hug and the popping out from under the 
24 do you send this child off all by herself with the · 24 sheets •. That's it. 
25 Ericksons? Grandma Snow obviously comes off to me as 25 Examine your own lives, ladies and gentlemen. If 
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I 1 someone wanted to look at you and look at you as a 1 I have two jury instructions I just briefly want to 
2 perpetrator of your children, what instances could they 2 touch on with you, ladies and gentlemen. The first one 
I 
3 look at in the most negative light and come out with 3 is Number 27. It says·· or not 27, I'in sorry. It must 
4 and couldn't they come out with more than two? 4 be back. It's Number 30. "You must not draw any 
5 Sometimes when you come out of the bathroom and you 5 inference of guilt from the fact that the defendant 
I 6 weren't dressed and your kids saw you, or some time 6 does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by 7 when you accidently walked in on your children and they 7 you or enter in your deliberations in any way. 11 The 
8 weren't dressed. All kinds of situations that happen 8 decision whether or not the defendant testified, one, 
I 9 in family context, they could come up with only two. 9 that's preserved and reserved to the defendant in 10 Now I want to talk about the plausibility in the 10 consultation with his lawyer. You may not infer 
11 context of Crystal's allegation. First off, Crystal 11 . anything from that. It's a constitutional right. 
I 12 never says anything until after she's been contaminated. . 12 And finally, I'd like you to look at Iustruction 13 by both grandmother and Lorissa. And she loves Lorissa 13 Number 4, which was the first jury instruction in the 
14 and she admitted that. She supports Lorissa. Is her 14 first set that you were given. So if it's not numbered 
I 15 story as equally explainable in supporting her 15 just go through till you get to the one that starts, "A 16 stepsister and anger at her father as it is that 16 defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be 
, , 17---tlomething-happened?-·Why,-yes. I-Vs-equally-plausible. 17 -innocent.'! It-should-stal't-0ut-ru1d-say,!'Adefendant in 
I 18 But let's take the facts that she says. First off, 18 a criminal action is presumed to be innocent." Has 19 she told the New Beginnings lady it happened after her 19 anybody found that? 
20 birthday. She tied it to an event in her life, after 20 TIIB COURT: It does have a 4 on it. 
I 21 her birthday. Her birthday being July 9th. She said 21 MR. WUTHRICH: Oh, does it? Okay. 22 it was '04. She swore in this courtroom under oath it 22 It defines reasonable doubt. It tells you the 
23 happened after her birthday in '04. And then they go 23 State has the burden of proving the. defendant beyond a 
I 24 have a conversation with grandmother and mom and they 24 reasonable doubt. And I told you at the beginning in 25 realize, well, it couldn't have happened in July of '04 25 this case I can't prove a negative. I can't prove 
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I 1 when I've already reported it in April of '04. Oops. 1 Scott Erickson is innocent. No man can. And we have a 
2 So she changes her testimony. She picks March. It had 2 heavy burden here. They didn't say it happened October 
I 3 to be March. Not related to any significant event in 3 13th of 2001 where I could go and get his work records 4 her life like her previous testimony was. Is that 4 and show that he was working out of state in Montana on 
5 believable? She says it happened when Bubba, James, 5 October 13th 2001 •. They didn't show·· they didn't 
I 6 was right in the bed next to her. Is that plausible? 6 state that it happened on May 27fu 2002 where I could 7 tgain, no bribing, no telling her don't tell mom, don't 7 go get his work records, I could go find out ifhe was 
8 tell anyone, Is this plausible? Is this believable if 8 on a date with someone, have an alibi witness. No. It 
I 9 he's genuinely a pedophile preying on kids? Is this 9 happened some time in 2001. It happened some time in 10 plausible? 10 2002. Crystal is 2003 to 2004. Can each of you account 
11 Lastly, they talk about his conversation with his 11 for every single day in two years? You can't. 
I 12 wife when hetells her to get these charges dropped. 12 · So it's a hard burden. I can't prove a negative. I 13 And she acknowledges that he at all times professes his 13 can't prove to you that he's innocent, And that's why 
14 innocence. She admits that. It's just as equally 14 the State has the burden of proving that he's guilty. 
I 15 likely that he felt like he was being blackmailed, that 15 And it's a high sta!Idard, beyond a reasonable doubt. 16 he felt like she had those kids turned on hinl and she 16 It's the state of the case, which after comparison and 
17 was going to put the screws to hinl and he could just 17 consideration of all of the evidence, leaves the mind 
I 18 take it or she could just have the property they have 18 of the jurors in a condition that they cannot say they 19 been fighting over for the past five years, viciously 19 feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the 
I 
· 20 fighting over. He didn't give me the car, he didn't 20 truth of the charge. To a moral certainty, That's what 
21 . give me the truck, he didn't give me this, he didn't 21 you have to be convinced of •. It's no~ "Do I tiiink 
22 give me that. Isn't that just as likely? I mean, you 22 something might have happened here?" That's not the 
I 
23 now have hinl in jail over this and I'm innocent so I 23 standard. The standard is to a moral certainty. 
24 give up, I surrender, You can have it all, just tell 24 And as Dr. Rybicki explained to you in this case, · 
25 the truth. Just have those kids tell the truth. 25 with some bad interviews and with no tape recorded 




1 interviews, some of which we don't even know how many 
2 numbers there are, with the contagion factors, with the 
3 alignment with mother and the disaligoment or 
4 alienation against father factors, all of those things 
5 cut against the credibility, cut against the 
6 credibility of this allegation. I can't say to a moral 
7 certainty it didn't happen. They can't prove it did 
8 happen. They can't prove that the moon is made of 
9 green cheese. I justhave to argue to you that they 
10 haven't proved that because I can't prove it isn't 
11 · true. 
12 That's my argomentto you, ladies and gentlemen. . . 
13 They have not made their case beyond a reasonable 
14 doubt. Would any of you feel comfortable being 
15 convicted by the state of this evidence, by the 
16 testimony of Lorissa Hottel who has at least three 
· 17 --tirnes-recanted,by-thetestimonyof-Grystal Erickson 
18 who initially recants and only after she has her 
19 . conversations with grandma and with Lorissa that she 
20 ever said anything ever happened to her? You know 
21 she's contaminated. In fact, she honestly told you, 
. 22 her testimony in this courtroom this week was as a 
23 result of her sitting down and talking with mom and 
24 grandma trying to figure out a date when it might have 
25 happe11ed. 
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1 Is that good evidence? Would you feel 
2 appropriately convicted by an abiding state of that 
3 kind of evidence by children who have a motive to lie? 
4 They're angry with this dad. They might even be 
5 · justifiably angry at this dad, but not for sexual abuse 
6 but for what he'd done in their mind. Caused her notto 
7 be a part of their lives for sigrrlficant periods of 
8 time, not giving them a car, not providing them with 
-9 the support the mom wants, stalking her, all these bad 
10 things. 
. 11 This is not a case, ladies and gentlemen, in which 
12 the State has met its burden. Not by any expert 
13 - determination, not by any common sense determination. 
14 We ask you to render a verdict of not guilty on all 
15 charges. Thank you. 
16 · TIIE COURT: Mr. Helm, you may do your short 
17 . rebuttal. · 
18 MR. HELM: I guess I'll plow this field a little 
19 bit again. I have what was on the screen. I got to 
20 get back to where it said. I guess the thing here is I . . 21 both- all the studies show thatfalse reporting is 
22 just very, very rare, aimo~ rninuscule. Perhaps four in 
23 3000 based on actlial experie11ce ofMydell. And the 
24 study cited by the defense witness of the percentage of 
25 false allegation in child custody cases, they were · 
I. 
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1 talking about two percent, but it says less than two 
2 percent. Then they say among the 129 allegation cases, 
.3 that's what we got right here, that was the slide, 50 
4 percent of those are children less than six •. Then you 
5 have·· that brings it down to approximately 65. 65 
6 percent of those with girls. So if you take the 65 
7 percent of the 65 and then 50 percent were actually 
8 believed to be, you come down another half of that and 
9 then 17 percent had insufficie11t evidence. It doesn't 
10 mean it didn't happen or it did and then you're down to 
11 one third. That is almost identical when you do the 
12 mathematics to what the experience was of Dr. Mydell. 
13 It's just remote, almost unusual. Just - you can't 
14 say it never happens because it does, and it's a 
15 terrible thing when it does. 
16 They're telling you it happened in this case, that 
17 both-these girls don'thave-anysay.-'l'wo girls got up 
18 and lied. There is really no custody battle here. 
19 This is when we have custody battles. There is no 
20 custody battle here. They're trying to convince you 
21 and make-believe there is a custody battle. Oh, gee 
22 whiz, morn moved out and he's over at Audra Bell's on 
23 all the weekends. Good heavens. He'sgotajob. He's 
24 got money, Now these guys just show up, hey, I want my 



























proved to be an unfit parent, you get shared custody of 
your kids, joint custody, legal and physieal. Been the 
law for a long time. Pretty easy. And morn's taking 
these kids and not letting you visit That's a pretty 
easy remedy. Atleast he's got a job and he's got some 
money. Her remedy might be_more difficult because of 
her financial situation circmnstances, but he's got an 
easy remedy. Just walks into court unless mom can 
prove he's unfit That's what the law says. I don't 
think there was a custody issue. They never went to 
court. Never any custody battle here. · There is as of 
aweekago. · 
So to suggest that this is a motive for lying,just 
ask yourself. He wants to talk about causation and 
probability and possibilities. I would tell you, I can 
never prove it where there is no possibility. There is 
always the mere possibility when you read these 
experts. What does he say on most of those statements? 
I.et me grab my glasses again. I'm not sure I 
understood it, but assuming I understand it, unknown 
dynamics. And he's talking about the 2001 alleged 
incident with Lorissa and Scott, and Lorissa claims 
Scott fondled her breast and butt while living in St 
Charles. No official report made. Unknown dynamics a 
that time. 
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II 1 Stepdaughter's at the age of 11 at the time. 1 rushed them off to a sterile room and had them all 2 Emerging adolescent issue, disturbed marital dynamics. 2 videotaped and have an expert come in and do this 
II 
3 We don't know - how does he know there is disturbed 3 forensic examination. Now think about that. That's 
4 marital dynamics in 2001? No evidence of that, yet oh 4 where they would want us to be, and in a perfect world 
5 boy, this is an expert, That's all he does is go 5 I would agree with that. I do not have a perfect world. 
II 
6 around testifying. He's sure that was something. He 6 I will never have a perfect world. !will never have 
7 doesn't have anything there. How does he know the 7 the perfect sexual allegati!lll case. It's just not 
8 dynamics? How does he know there was a disturbed 8 real. 
II 
9 marital? 9 We can look at some of these things, and I'm not 
10 Possible discussion. This was 2002 between, it 10 going to be able to go over them, I don't want to go 
11 looks like May 102 to September '02, alleged fondling 11 over all them. I want to kind of focus on some of the 
II 12 of Heather Hess by Troy Erickson, the defendant's 12 things the defense attorney said ifl can read my 13 brother, at Margaret Erickson's home, same location. 13 writing. A major property dispute going on between mom 
14 Allegedfondling of Shaylee Hess, 14, by Troy Erickson 14 and dad. Not a property fight. I can tell you that. 
II 15 and Robert Walker, Again, brothers and half-brpthers. 15 I've been a lawyer long enough. They lost the property 16 No official report made. What does he put down? 16 to the bank. They lost the cars to the bank. They don't 
... 17 -Fossiblediscussion-lUld-0ialog between-cousins.-·- 17 havealot to fight over, Theydon1thave1thouse, ·-
II 18 Collusion. Good heavens, folks. If you're going to · · 18 They're fighting over a few old cars. But major 19 form opinions, get a factual basis for it. We don't 19 property Joss? No. She needed a vehicle to getto and 
20 have anything like that, do we? Possible. We take 20 from work, needed a vehicle to take care of our kids. 
II 21 what is mere possibility, absolutely n9 evidence, and 21 That's a major property? That's how defense 22 drew a conclusion from the expert they've got to be 22 characterized it contrary to the facts. 
23 telling the truth. Possible elaboration, memory 23 Crystal. She swore in this courtroom that it 
II 24 revision, suggestibility. 24 happened on her birthday in 2004. She never swore in 25 Possible elaboration, memory revision. Possible, 25 this courtroom. You heard her testimony. She thought 
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II 1 possible, possible, possible. I would agree that when 1 it happened when? Some time January, February, March. 
2 we're talking about child molestation there is a lot of 2 I think she probably isolated it in March of 2004. Did · 
I 3 things possible. To use that as the basis not to 3 she correct prior testimony? Yes. But he said she 4 believe these children is just phony. If all it does 4 swore in this courtroom.· She did not swear in this 
5 is to bring an expert, a paid expert who does it for a 5 courtroom. 
I 6 living, they come into a courtroom and tell you of 6 Now, he asked her at the preliminary hearing if she 7 possibilities with no factual basis for much of it, 7 was correct. Well, that was pretty obvious, wasn't it? 
8 . that's all it takes for reasonable doubt, we will never 8 My birthday is I think July 9th or something she said. 
I 9 convict another person of molesting children. 9 I reported this in April. I'm now alleging it happened · 10 If we are held to the standard that I have to have 10 after I reported it. Well, she was confused on the · 
11 the perfect interviewer and the perfect situation so 11 time. I was confused. Well, that's improbable. When 
I 12 there is no possibility -- even if you had a perfect 12 they report it there had to be a solution and event. 13 interview he's still saying, well, we got possible 13 · Well, she knows when she was living at grandma's. She 
14 family dynamics at work here. Possible they talked 14 knew her mother was in rehab and narrows it down, 
I 15 this over with their cousins. It's just not a real 15 doesn't she? January, February, March because! 16 world. If that is what this jury, if that's what Main 16 reported it in April. I don't have to be a rocket 
17 Street in Bear Lake County is telling me or lilw 17 scientist. I can be a confused child to still figure ,. 18 enforcement, it's impossible. I cannot meet that ivory 18 · that out. That's all that happened. Butto suggest she 
19 tower attitude. It's just not there. 19 · got up here in this courtroom and swore to it is just 
I 
20 Think about it yourself. If you had a child in 20 not there. You've got your notes. You heard it. It 
21 that position or a grandchild, it would never happen. 21 didn't happen. 
22 You would probably question it What do you mean? 22 . The other thing, when you go back to Bright 
I 
23 Whatdidhesay? Whatdidhedo? What's this 23 Tomorrow, I think this is an interview- I understand 
24 professor-what's this doctor going to come back and 24 we had to bring this case up almost three years after 
























































that late, it's just that we dropped the ball and 
didn't get it and I told you that in the beginuing. Do 
not blame the children for that. He was trying to make 
something out of that. Well, they brought it up in 
2004 and then it was dropped and then they bring it 
back up again in 2006 because she's gone back in for 
some more rehab. We dropped the ball. That's just the 
gravel and the straw. It's just not true. They brought 
itup. 
When you hear her testimony in 2007 I believe it 
is, ifI got my time right, it's at Bright Tomorrow. 
What does she say? What does she tell you? What came · 
out? Is this going to be used to put my dad in jail? 
She wants to know that before she's going to talk. 
Nervous, scared. Is this going to be used to put my 
dad injail? Still reluctant. Always reluctant. If 
-they're·motivatedtolie-to·protect-mom;-they're······· · 
anxious to testify, they're willing. "Let me get up 
there. Let me tell you," That's not the case here. 
Draw upon your common sense. ls it a story that has 
some fficonsistency? Yes, it is. It always will be. 
He can't offer an alibi because we can't pin a 
time. Well, you can always give notice of alibi. 
Don't buy that one either. It's another smoke screen. 
Did you notice an alibi? You got to start providing 
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it. It doesn't exist in these cases. Not going to 
happen. 
The motive for lying is custody of the kids. 
Probably the motive is just the opposite. He might 
criticize mom for not being more protective, criticize 
mom for not being there, I think those are all valid, 
but to now suggest that Crystal and Lorissa are lying 
on the basis of custody is ridiculous, Lorissa is 18 
years old. She's been at Job Corps for the last two or 
three years. Crystal's with Health and Welfare. Grandma 
is acting as a foster home. Mom to this day is not . . 
even asking for custody as I understood what they're 
saying. Doesn't want dad to have it, but she 
understands she's got some problems and got some trust 
· to rebuild with her own children. She's looking for 
lhat extended family to help her. 
Barbara was there. Barbara somehow on lhe defense 
part becomes lhe evil-doer: You know, and I understand 
. that he misstates that. My recollection was Barbara 
didn't report anything, Barbara didn'ttell him to get 
out. She said she did not know about it until the 
officers came to her house or called her on the phone 
and told her. She had suspicions. She didn't run out, 
oh, chicken ~ttle, the sky is falling in. She showed . 
amazing restraint, remarkable restraint. She never said 
522 
1 whattheysaidshesaid. "I would leave, too." Well, 
2 she didn't tell him to leave. I said, "What happened?" 
3 "Well, he grabbed his bag and left." She never kicked 
4 him out. He was back later. Health and Welfare said he 
5 can't live there anymore after these allegations came 
6 back. Moved out then. But the characterization that 
7 Barbara Snow is an evil monster, kind of the unintended 
8 person that motivated the children is false, not based 
9 on anything you heard here. 
10 And that was not what Tammy said. She's wanting 
11 some vehicle to provide money, jobs, things for her 
12 kids. Help me out. I know your parents won'tlet me 
13 have it and if you tell them, you know •• she didn't 
14 say get the kids to tell the truth, you can have it. . 
15 She said go get it dismissed. Talk to your mom, talk 
16 to Health and Welfare, talk to the kids. Have them go 
17 · -in-and dismiss-it.-That'swhat-she said,- ... . ... . 
18 I think you could talk about a lot of things on the 
19 time line, I think you can talk a lot about the 
20 possibilities, but we have to focus upon the children 
21 and the dynamics of what's going on in their mind. 
22 Focus upon what some of the experts told us. Look at 
23 that. Look at that line and just does your gut tell 
24 you they're telling the truth? I'll be the first to 
25 admit; if you do not believe Lorissa, then you should 
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1 acquit this man .. If you do not believe Crystal, then 
2 you should acquit this man. If you believe they both 
3 got up and falsified these statements for whatever 
4 reason, you just simply do not believe the girls, then 
5 you must acquit. 
6 If you believe the girls are telling the truth when 
7 they said their. father fondled them; when they said 
8 their father did lewd acts or sexual battery, if you 
9 believe those things took place based upon all the 
10 evidence at this trial, then you are duty bound to 
11 convict the same way. If you don't believe, you should 
12 acquit. 
13 · I think they're believable. I can look at some of 
14 the defense witnesses and one of them I think as I 
15 recall was - let me get back to my notes; I think it 
16 was Janette Erickson - a lot of family in here 
17 testifying to save their uncle. She got up and tried 
18 to make some statement out ofLorissa's mouth. And I 
19 want to get it, my notes, so I can quote direct. "All 
20 that bullshit She was sick of it. Just a bunch of 
21 lies,• Does that mean she thinks the family is lying 
22 about her, they're telling stories about her, calling 
23 her names, suggesting she's not believable? That just 
24 as easily could be that. But I'm not even sure she 
25 said it because we bring her son in and he says, "Tell 
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Ii 1 Scott not to worry about anything because nothing 1 father, this defendant, be convicted. What he 
2 happened." Two witnesses, both for the defense, one the 2 breached, the trust he breached, cannot happen without 
Ii 3 mother, one the son and I get two statements like that. 3 consequences. The trust he breached as a parent to his 4 They're not even close, It's not believable. 4 daughters cannot happen withi,ut consequeuces, You must 
5 Remember, Glade told you he_had to recant some of 5 convict him to serve justjce. A conviction of guilty 
II 6 his testimony at his last son's trial. I have family 6 is justice in this case, Thank you, 7 testifying for family, They have bias, They have 7 THE COURT: Madam clerk, will you swear the marshal 
8 prejudice, What did the Walker girl tell you? I asked 8 in as the bailiff for the jury? 
II 9 her first, "Do you have any feelings toward me? Do you 9 (Marshal sworn,) 10 dislike me?" ''No," What was her last statement? "I 10 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, this case is now 
11 don't like you. You put my dad in jail.• I put his 11 in your hands. The bailiff will take you into the jury 
II 12 brother in jail for similar conduct 12 room to deliberate. 13 And did the tape really play that long? I listened 13 BAILIFF: Do you have the exhibits and the verdict 
II 
14 to the tape, but I've listened to it a lot more than 14 form? 
15 you and probably in a lot better circumstances. I can 15 THE COURT: We do. The exhibits are right here, 
16 hear the good-bye, "I got to put my cigarette out. 16 the verdict and the original instructions. 
.... 
17 Good-bye. "llut Whanlid Walker say? Well,the 17 ----BAILIFF:--Okay.Thankyou.- - -- ·· · · -
II 18 conversation continued for a half-an-hour. Tammy said 18 THE COURT: Court's in recess. . 19 it's one of those i,ld recording machines. It's not 19 (In the absence of the jury.) 
ll 
20 digital. Put a tape in them and they can record a lot 20 MR. WUTHRICH: I have one motion before we recess, 
21 of conversation to get to the end of the tape. Why 21 your Honor. 
22 isn't there other conversations on that tape? Why did 22 THE COURT: Oh, let's get the door shut first. 
II 
23 Ijusthaveone? I don't know. Whyisn'tthenext 23 You can be seated. 
24 half-hour on there? 1 have family protecting family. 24 THE COURT: Mr. Wuthrich, go ahead. 
25 I have family willing to get up, stretch, or just 25 MR. WUTHRICH: YourHonor,Ididn'twantto 
II 
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1 simply tell falsehoods or mistaken. 1 interrupt Mr. Hehn in this, and I had different 
2 Audra Bell. Yep, there every weekend. That was in · 2 opinions of it, but it appears to me that he commented 
I 3 what, 2004? There every weekend. I didn't know what it 3 on the evidence improperly. He specifically said, "I 4 really had much to do with the case, whether these 4 find them credible," And, you know, rather than they 
5 girls are telling the truth or not, but that's what we 5 · are credible, and he made it personal in that context, 
II 6 heard. I just think the bottom line is this, it's our 6 and I do believe that violates the rule. But I've had 7 communities and our families, our children.· We have 7 Judge Harding rule against me on that And I know it's .. 
I 
8 the legal, moral, ethic obligation to protect them. 8 Ardee's technique and I know it's his style, but I 
9 You set a standard for myself as prosecutor. You set 9 think it crosses that line, There are cases out there 
10 the standard for law enforcement. We look at these 10 that say that the prosecutor calinot make those kind of 
I 
11 cases very carefully. What is the standard in Bear 11 comments and you're not supposed to make those commeD 
12 lake County by a jury on what they're going to accept 12 on the evidence. And I thought in his .,. not so much 
13 as proof of child molestation? That's all it's about. 13 in the rebuttal, but in bis opening argument, that he 
I 
14 And if you're saying Mr. Hehn, Lorissa, Crystal, 14 did cross that line on at least three occasions. And I 
15 Officer Martinez, it's just not there, I've got to have 15 guess I move for mistrial on those grounds, 
16 more than this, we understand that, but there is also a 16 Where he specifically commented that, "I think 
I 
· 17 · downside to it. lcan'tbringyoutheperfectcase. 17 . they're credible, I think the story was credible." 
18 There will always be the possibility there. I bring 18 Those I remember specifically, and I'd have to go 
19 you two people molested by their father at pretty much 19 through a transcript, but I know there were three I had 
I 20 thesameage. Onegivescredibilitytotheother. One 20 in my mind. I ahnost objected immediately and brought 21 collaborates the other. The pattern is similar. 21 itto the Court's attention, but the last time I did 
22 . Circumstancesaresimilar. Youasajuroraresayingl 22 that with Mr. Harding, Judge Harding, he said, no, no, 
I 23 don't believe either one of them. 23 hecansaythat. Andsoljustdidn't. Ihopethe 24 Ladies and gentlemen, I tell you this is proof 24 Court understands, and I don't know if that's a timing 
25 beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice demands that this 25 issue, I should have done it differently or not. 
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